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Reporters “embedded” with U.S. military units during the first two months of the Iraq 
War (2003-) dealt with a number of impediments the combination of which was 
previously unseen in the history of war reporting. These included physical proximity, 
bonding, and shared peril with American soldiers, informal self-censorship based on 
“ground rules,” and technological capacity for real-time visual transmission of 
reportage. These and other factors such as travel restrictions and post-9/11 editorial 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Top military brass liked the Defense Department’s “embedding” program. It 
was a way in which to channel journalistic eagerness to be on the front lines, 
witnessing the “first draft of history,” into the many-valved organ of the armed 
forces.  Reporters would eat, sleep, and interact with—and more likely than not 
befriend—the soldiers in their units. This would lead to—the architects of embedding 
hoped—a positive aggregate picture of military operations during the Iraq War. 
 The U.S. Department of Defense—specifically Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld—and President George W. Bush reasoned that placing troops within 
military units offered the greatest possibility for countering misleading press reports 
or negative propaganda from Middle Eastern news sources.
1
 Proximity to the 
battlefield, in addition to technology that made real-time event coverage possible, 
supporters argued, allowed the public a more intimate look into the confusion, horror, 
bravery, and sacrifice of war than ever before.
2
 As Terence Smith wrote for the 
Columbia Journalism Review, the combination of cutting-edge broadcast technology 
                                                 
1
 Jeffrey C. Bliss. “Iraq: The Press Goes to War.” Hoover Digest. No. 3. (2003) 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3057436.html. “It was President Bush and Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who thought that embedding reporters with military units would help win 
the propaganda war at a time when the United States seemed to be losing it in the Arab world. If 
military leaders let reporters hear and see what they were doing, the resulting stories would do the 
administration more good than harm in the battle to win over Muslims to the American cause: This 
was a big part of the rationale behind the mandate to open it up.” 
2
 Jim Garamone. American Forces Press Service. (Air University, Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base) 
Mar. 26, 2003. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/embedded.htm. ASDPA Victoria “Torie” 
Clarke: “First reports of the process have been positive. “So far, the embedding seems to have gone 
very well,”….“Americans and people around the world are seeing firsthand the wonderful dedication 




and physical closeness would lend itself to “a kind of intimate, immediate, absorbing, 
almost addictive coverage, the likes of which we have not seen before.”
3
  
Defense Department officials’ hopes were fulfilled—the strategy worked.  
Like an Impressionist painting, the flood of intense, personal, affecting, and 
predominantly objective reports displayed at least a recognizable pattern of the war’s 
progression on both strategic and human fronts.
4
  
Journalists also largely describe the program as a success.  About 80 percent 
of 159 Iraq war reporters surveyed between January and March 2004 said embedded 
journalists were successful in their reporting of the war.  Only 17.5 percent of 
reporters polled by Fahmy and Johnson said that war coverage by “embeds” was 
biased; 21.4 percent felt that reports from embeds were sensationalized.
5
  
This is not to say that journalists were entirely uncritical of the program, 
though. Ninety percent of reporters surveyed said that while embedded reporters 
avoided bias and sensationalism, the reports they produced from the field provided 
only a “narrow slice of the conflict.”
6
 In 2003 embedded reporter George C. Wilson 
of the National Journal said on PBS’s NewsHour with Jim Lehrer that embedded 
reporters were “somewhat like the second dog on the dogsled team…you saw an 
                                                 
3
 “The Real-Time War: Defining news in the Middle East.” Columbia Journalism Review. May/June 
2003. http://cjrarchives.org/issues/2003/3/standard-smith.asp.  
4
 See e.g.: Sean Aday, Steven Livingston, and Maeve Hebert. “Embedding the Truth: A Cross-Cultural 
Analysis of Objectivity and Television Coverage of the Iraq War.” The Harvard International Journal 
of Press/Politics. Vol.10, no.3. (2005) “[E]mbedded reporters had among the highest percentage of 
neutral [in tone] stories…of any type of reporter.” 
5
 Shahira Fahmy and Thomas Johnson, “How We Performed: Embedded Journalists’ Attitudes & 
Perceptions Toward Covering the Iraq War.” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly. Vol. 82, 






awful lot of the dog in front of you and a little bit to the left and the right.”
7
 This 
“dogsled” effect resulted from the way the embedding program was structured.  
Embeds were given greater free rein within the operations of their assigned units than 
had been the case since the conflicts following the Vietnam war
8
, but were 
constrained for the sake of safety and other considerations to mirroring the motion of 
that unit, curtailing reportorial freedom by situational lack of access.
9
 
Access, for the purposes of this paper, will be defined as the combination of 
all the elements to which a reporter must be exposed in order to cover a story well, 
including depth, opposing points of view, observable firsthand descriptions of events, 
and the means by which to relay information to consumers of news. The effects of 
editorial decisions and self-censorship will also be explored. Access to events in a 
war zone, access to those affected, access to the technological means to give the raw 
story material to their editors (filing), and relative freedom from unreasonable 
censorship are part of the concept of access in this case.  Walter Lippmann wrote that 
the most obvious place to find news is “where people’s affairs touch public 
authority.”
10
  By that definition, a war equals almost constant newsworthiness.  A 
                                                 
7
 “The Media’s War.” (Transcript). The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer. PBS. Apr. 21, 2003. 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june03/embed_4-21.html.  
8
 See e.g.: Chip Reid. “Recalling life as an embedded reporter.” NBC News. Mar. 14, 2004. “After all, 
the argument went, we depended on the Marines for access and for our own safety. Not to mention the 
fact that reporters became friends with and in many cases (definitely in my case), admired the troops 
they were covering. The commanding officer of my battalion gave us virtually unlimited access, even 
on sensitive stories. He said his orders were to let us report on ‘the good, the bad and the ugly.’ And 
that's what we did.” Also: Baker, Peter. “Inside View.” American Journalism Review. May 2003. 
http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=2993.  
9
 Judith Sylvester and Suzanne Huffman. Reporting from the Front. Lanham (Md.): Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2005. p. 123. “There were reporters I knew who were upset because they 
couldn’t get transportation to go talk to other people about what was happening. The commanding 
officers wanted us to let them know where we were, if we left the unit. It just didn’t seem that it was 
worth it to move about.”  
10




combat zone is hypersaturated with intersections between people’s affairs and public 
authority, sometimes in the bluntest and most grisly manner possible. 
The concept of “access” for the individual embedded reporter turned out to 
determine quality and breadth of coverage during offensive operations before the fall 
of Baghdad. Reporting in the Iraq War—much like World War II—involved 
journalists reconciling abstract patriotic outrage at an attack on U.S. soil with the 
imperative to report on the war at hand
11
, and balancing emotional attachment to the 
soldiers that reporters covered with the need to report military actions honestly and 
fairly.
12
  The degree of access achieved specifically by embedded reporters in this 
most recent conflict was determined by a number of factors that had not been seen in 
this particular combination in the history of war reporting. These factors included: 1) 
close physical proximity, shared danger, and companionship with soldiers; 2) 
subjective and/or informal censorship, as opposed to formal submission of 
transmitted text to censors; and 3) the technological capacity for real-time 
transmission of live visual reportage.  
Each of these factors on its own—and sometimes in combination with one or 
two of the others—has been a part of war reporting in the past. The first combat 
reporters in recorded history were considered part of the armed forces, sharing meals, 
                                                 
11
 Lawrence Nakatsuka. “Star-Bulletin’s only Japanese reporter sent to interview ‘enemy.’ Honolulu 
Star-Bulletin. Dec. 4, 1999. “As for myself, there was no ambiguity: I was born, raised and educated 
an American. Period. The Star-Bulletin accepted me as an American without qualms. It had no doubts 
at all about my loyalty as an American…On that Sabbath morning of Dec. 7, 1941, I was still asleep at 
home when my phone rang. ‘This is Howard Case.’ My city editor's voice was taut and tense. ‘Get 
down here to the office right away!’ I raced to the city room on Merchant Street downtown. The place 
was jumping with activity….I wanted to get in on the action. I wanted something to do, anything.” 
12
 Brian Corbin. “‘Voice of common soldier’ lives on at museum.” Evansville (Ill.) Courier & Press. 
Oct. 28, 2007. “‘He basically was the voice of the common soldier: What he focused on and what he 
was interested in was what the GIs experienced and their daily lives,’ said David Weaver, acting 
manager of the [Ernie Pyle] state historic site. ‘Today, you have embedded reporters out with the 
troops; well, that was kind of Ernie Pyle's idea. He lived with the troops, he camped with them, he 




lodging, and travel with the troops: In 424 BCE, Thucydides led the Athenian fleet at 
Thasos and simultaneously penned an account of his forces’ defeat at the hands of the 
Spartans.
13
 As an army commander as well as correspondent, Thucydides of course 
was an armed participant in the battle. The post of the modern unarmed professional 
war correspondent began with William “Billy” Russell, who covered several wars for 
the London Times, including the Crimean War in the 1850s and the Austro-Prussian 
War of 1866. Russell was not fed or housed by the British armed forces, however; he 
had to provide his own tent, horse, and rations.
14
  
In America, the notion of journalists traveling along with the troops under 
military supervision and protection was not a new one. Mark Kellogg, a freelance 
reporter traveling with Lt. Col. George Custer’s Seventh Cavalry Regiment at the 
Battle of Little Bighorn was allowed by Custer to follow the regiment against the 
orders of superior officers, bunking with the troops and sharing meals before the 
engagement on June 26, 1876. On that day, Kellogg rode a slow mule behind the 
charging cavalry onto the field of battle, and died along with Custer and his troops.
15
 
Part of the lot of the war reporter who lived with soldiers is also to face the same 
mortal peril as the soldiers. A World War I correspondent for The New Republic, 
Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant, was gravely wounded near Reims, France in 1918 when 
                                                 
13
 Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Rex Warner, trans. New York: Penguin Classics, 
2001. p. 328. “They and Eucles, the general from Athens who was there to defend the place, sent to the 
other general in Thrace, Thucydides, the son of Olorus, the author of this history, who was then at the 
island of Thasos, a colony of the Parians, about half a day’s sail from Amphipolis, asking him to come 
to their relief.” 
14
 William Russell (2004). “The Evolution of War Reporting from the Crimea to Iraq.”  
15
 Harold M. Evans. “The Combat Correspondent: A look at war reporting from Caesar’s 




an Army Lieutenant near her picked up an unexploded grenade.
16
 War writer Ernie 
Pyle, who became famous for roving the front lines during World War II looking for 
“tellable stories,” was killed in 1945 on the island of Ie Shima when a machine 
gunner’s stray bullet hit his left temple.
17
 
A system of informal censorship based on a set of rules generated by the 
military and agreed to by war correspondents was likewise not unique to the second 
war in Iraq. Certainly, the government has both used the press and limited the press 
since America’s first war, the Revolution of 1775 to 1783. Gen. George Washington 
and his allies sometimes provided the colonial press with inflated figures for British 
casualties.
18
 Washington also complained about wartime journalists’ detailed 
reporting. “It is much to be wished that our printers were more discreet in many of 
their publications. We see, almost in every paper, proclamation or accounts 
transmitted by the enemy of an injurious nature. If some limit or caution could be 
given them on the subject, it might be of material service.”
19
 
Formal censorship of military reporters’ material in America had its 
beginnings in the Sedition Act of 1798 under the specter of war with France, and was 
carried through the Civil War to all U.S. conflicts up to and including operations in 
Korea. Though war was not actually declared on France in the last decade of the 18
th
 
century, the administration of President John Adams signed into law the Sedition Act, 
                                                 
16
 Tad Bartimus. “Bullets and Bathrooms.” Media Studies Journal. Vol. 15, no. 1. (Summer 2001) p. 9. 
“A stunning report, a blinding flash, and I am precipitated down the bank, hearing, it seems, as I go, 
the Lieutenant’s shriek of horror: ‘My arm! My arm has been carried away!’ …The surgeon is bending 
over my wounds now…I am getting ether in large quantities. Sensation of vibration—of waves 
beating, and through it voices very clear: Who is she? A journalist.”  
17
 Owen V. Johnson. “Ernie Pyle: 60 years after his death.” Bloomington (Ind.) Herald-Times. April 
15, 2005. http://journalism.indiana.edu/news/041505pyle/.  
18
 “Blame Grenada! American invasion of tiny Caribbean island changed everything for press.” (2001) 
19
 Philander D. Chase. The Papers of George Washington. Vol. 9. Charlottesville: University of 




which made publishing “any false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings 
against the government of the United States…with intent to defame, or to bring them 




During the American Civil War, both Union and Confederate correspondents 
were numerous. In the North, large newspapers such as the New York Herald had as 
many as 60 war reporters in the field.
21
 The North subjected its correspondents to no 
formal censorship, leading Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman to complain: 
 “They publish without stint positive information of movements 
 past [and] prospective, organizations, names of commanders, and  
 accurate information which reaches the enemy with as much  
 regularity as it does our People…[N]o matter how rapidly we move, 
 the enemy has advance notice…Never had an enemy a better corps  
 of spies than our army carries along, paid, transported, and fed by 
 the United States.”
22
 
For this reason, the Lincoln administration suppressed publishing of certain 
facts in Union newspapers.
23
 Meanwhile, the Confederacy used a sort of “pool” 
system in which local journalists would cover battles close to their locations.
24
 In 
World Wars I and II, offices of censorship were established on the home front to 
prevent information such as that causing Sherman such grief during the Civil War—
prospective troop movements, names of operations, etc.—from reaching enemy eyes 
and ears. Few reporters objected to these policies because of a strong nationalistic 
sentiment that—as Byron Price, director of the U.S. Office of Censorship in 1942, 
                                                 
20
 Geoffrey Stone. Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War 
on Terrorism. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004. p. 36. 
21
 Russell (2004). “The Evolution of War Reporting from the Crimea to Iraq.” p. 32. 
22
 Peter S. Prichard. “Basic Training.” Media Studies Journal. Vol. 15, no. 1. (Summer 2001) p. 54. 
23
 Jacqueline E. Sharkey. “War, Censorship, and the First Amendment.” Media Studies Journal. Vol. 
15, no. 1. (Summer 2001.) pp. 20-21. 
24




said—“the outcome of the war is of vital personal concern to the future of every 
American citizen.”
25
 Veteran CBS correspondent Walter Cronkite supports 
censorship in the case of full access to the battlefront. “They’ve obviously got to be 
sure that we are not releasing any military secrets in the copy we file thereafter. I 
believe in censorship. It worked pretty well.”
26
 The press notice for D-Day (June 6, 
1944) indicated that each corps beaching at Normandy that day would be 
accompanied by seven war reporters, three photographers, two public relations 
officers, two radio operators and two driver-messengers. Four censors also 
accompanied each battalion. Stories filed from the battlefield had to be submitted to 
the censors before they were transmitted electronically for publication, and any copy 
carried by boat was checked in the United Kingdom before being transmitted.
27
 
During operations in Korea, there was no official censorship until Chinese 
intervention in the war in 1950. When commanders complained that sensitive 
information such as notices of troop movement and the existence of a new fighter 
plane were being released via the American press, reporters were required to submit 
their stories to Army and Air Force censors. The government also established a 
Japan-based censorship office for television footage in March 1951.
28
 Only during the 
war in Vietnam were reporters truly free of most government intervention (this will 
be discussed at length in section I of this paper, Traditional and Historical Blocks to 
Access).  
                                                 
25
 Byron Price. “What Can and What Cannot be Printed in War Time.” Congressional Digest. Feb. 
1942. pp. 36-37. 
26
 Sylvester and Huffman (2005). Reporting from the Front. p. 14. 
27
 Hernandez, Debra Gersh. “The Simple Days of War Coverage.” Editor & Publisher. Vol. 127, no. 
31. (July 30, 1994)  
28




The third factor, capacity for real-time satellite-uplinked visual coverage of a 
war has only been a consideration for less than two decades. Satellite-based live feed 
for both print and broadcast journalists went from sporadic and expensive in the late 
1980s and early 1990s to prevalent by the time of the conflict in Bosnia in 1992.
29
  In 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, advanced technology—including internet filing and 
broadcasting—presented its own set of difficulties, explored in the second part of this 
paper, New Restrictions, New Considerations. 
Before the start of operations in Iraq in 2003, journalists, of course, were 
unable to anticipate the combination of mitigating factors that would prevent 
embedded journalists from seeing the full scope of the conflict during Iraqi Freedom. 
In 1992, reporters and journalism scholars made a list, a “statement of principles,” of 
the failures of military-press cooperation after the end of the Vietnam War. The press 
essentially wanted the military and Defense Department to correct what they physical 
access to the battlefield during combat, unlike what was granted in Grenada; an end 
to the “pool” system that so disappointed reporters during first Gulf War; and—




                                                 
29
 Edith M Lederer. “From Telex to Satellite.” Media Studies Journal. Vol. 15, no. 1. (Summer 2001) 
pp. 18-19. 
30
 “Principles that should govern future arrangements for news coverage from the battlefield of the 
United States military in combat.” Adopted Aug. 11, 1992. Courtesy of Poynter Online. 
http://www.poynter.org/content/content_view.asp?id=6242&sid=44 “1.Open and independent 
reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations. 2. Press pools are not to 
serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. Pools may sometimes provide the 
only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and 
disbanded at the earliest opportunity (within 24 to 36 hours when possible). The arrival of early access 
pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area. 3. Even 
under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at 
extremely remote locations or where space is limited. 4. Journalists in a combat zone will be 
credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground 




The great irony of the embedding program is that while the Defense 
Department acquiesced to all of these demands,
31
 more subtle and pervasive obstacles 
to access cropped up in their place. Embedded reporters experienced legal, physical, 
ideological, and emotional blocks to unfettered reporting that narrowed their field of 
vision. 
The first part of this paper examines, in the context of the conflicts leading up 
to the 2003 Iraq War, more traditional obstacles to access, such as legal blocks, denial 
of physical admission to the field of combat, and military distrust of press motives.  
For instance, Hustler publisher Larry Flynt faced legal obstacles to access when his 
bid to send reporters with special operations troops to Afghanistan shortly after 9/11 
failed on appeal in federal court. The first section discussed the scaling back of 
reporter access to U.S. combat operations that happened in the mid-1970s, and the 
slow return of reporters to the thick of combat operations between 1975 and 2003. 
Some veteran war reporters believe that the optimum level of access to battlefield 
operations was achieved during U.S. operations in Vietnam between 1965 and 1975, 
and that reporters have since been prevented from returning to that ideal because 
                                                                                                                                           
suspension of credentials and expulsion of the journalist involved from the combat zone. News 
organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to 
make them familiar with U.S. military operations. 5. Journalists will be provided access to all major 
military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases. 6. Military public affairs 
officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process. 7. Under conditions 
of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military 
vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools. 
8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, 
secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever 
possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, 
journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The military will not ban 
communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in 
battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.”  
31
 Donald Rumsfeld. “Public affairs guidance (PAG).” February 2003. 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/d20030228pag.pdf. Sec. 1. “Media will be embedded with 





military higher-ups believe that negative media coverage influenced public opinion 
and lost the military the war in Vietnam.
32
 The first part ends with an explanation of 
how the Pentagon and the Defense Department sought to reach out to the American 
press through the embedding program, and sought to provide for access and freedom 
from censorship that would at least match the level of freedom achieved during the 
Vietnam conflict. 
The second section explores new obstacles to battlefield access that were 
unique both to the embedded reporter and to the Iraq War. Access to combat action, 
unlike in Vietnam, depended on the embedded reporter’s unit assignment, and even 
more on the mode of transportation the unit used, satellite uplink access, the caprice 
of the commanding officer—even the weather. Some embedded reporters who saw a 
lot of combat with their assigned units, and the others saw little or none at all.  
Journalists embedded with infantry units often spent long, cramped days on the road 
to Baghdad riding in virtually windowless Bradley fighting vehicles, exiting only to 
sleep and camp. One of the reporters who died during the push toward Baghdad, 
David Bloom of NBC, suffered from a fatal pulmonary embolism that may have been 
caused by sitting in a cramped Bradley.
33
 During the initial push toward the capital, 
many military units told their embeds that they did not have time for the reporters to 
stop in the small villages along the road—either hostile or friendly—to gauge the 
reactions of ordinary Iraqi citizens to the war. Safety considerations necessitated that 
                                                 
32
 Sylvester and Huffman (2005). Reporting From the Front. See e.g.: Schieffer, p. 20. “Vietnam was 
maybe the last and maybe the only war in American history where there was no censorship.” Also: 
Cronkite, p. 16. “[T]he press has never since had the kind of freedom that it had in Vietnam…” “It was 
that kind of freedom and that lack of censorship that suffered…the old army command from Vietnam, 
many of them blamed the press and television for losing the war for them.” 
33





the journalists travel along with them, leaving precious little time to interview 
ordinary Iraqi citizens—and few translators were available if the time was there. 
What was always available was access to conversation with soldiers; and their points 
of view. George Wilson’s “dogsled” analogy made itself manifest as embeds got to 
know the soldiers and operations of their units intimately, but had only fleeting 
glimpses of the effect of the war past the muzzles of the unit’s guns.
34
 
Adding to the aspect of “luck of the draw” that defined embedding, the way in 
which the journalist was received by the unit—positively, negatively, or 
ambivalently—varied by unit assignment. Certain commanders were more open and 
less skeptical of embeds, while suspicion and distrust prevailed with others. For 
instance, William Branigin of The Washington Post said that he received unexpected 
support from unit commanders when he told them he intended to cover the mistaken 
shooting of a vanload of Iraqi civilians by U.S. soldiers at a security checkpoint.
35
  On 
the other hand, Brett Lieberman of the Harrisburg (Pennsylvania) Patriot-News, 
despite being well liked by his unit, got into a shouting match with a Marine 
lieutenant colonel and the unit’s public affairs officer over a story in which he 
reported on some of the technical capabilities of the unit. Lieberman had run all of the 
information he planned to use in the story by the Marine battalion commanders he 
spoke to, but they had not gone up the chain of command to verify that the 
information did not violate any of the ground rules—such as explicitly giving away 
troop position or strength—laid out in Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s public affairs 
                                                 
34
 See note 7. 
35
 Bill Katovsky and Timothy Carlson. Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq. Guilford (Conn.): The 
Lyons Press, 2003. p. 233. “The military commanders all said from day one that they understood 










As much as access depended on the attitudes of commanding officers toward 
the press, it also depended on the news organization with which the embed was 
affiliated. Fox News channel correspondent Rick Levanthal reported being very well 
received by the Second Battalion, 23
rd
 Marines because of the perception that Fox’s 
coverage in the run-up to the war had been overwhelmingly pro-Bush administration, 
pro-war.
38
  On the other side of the spectrum, Al-Jazeera reporter Amr El-Kakhy told 
of being purposely left out of briefings because of his affiliation with the station.
39
 
Part II also addresses how media “star power” affected access—both 
positively and negatively. Embed and Nightline (ABC) anchor Ted Koppel could 
easily break from his assigned unit to get a broader view of the conflict, because his 
distinguished career brought him name recognition that other journalists did not 
have.
40
 Star power and a troop-friendly network affiliation, however, were not 
enough to stop the disembedding of former network talk show host and Fox News 
                                                 
36
 Rumsfeld (2003). “Public affairs guidance (PAG).” Sec. 4. “Ground Rules. “The following 
categories of information are not releasable…Specific number of aircraft…specific number of troops.” 
37
 Katovsky and Carlson (2003). Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq. p. 321. “The story ran in 
Saturday’s paper. Around Saturday morning about 6:00 a.m. when we got up, I found that I had an 
appointment at the Public Affairs Office…Later that day, they told me to get my gear and leave Echo 
Company.” 
38
 Ibid. p. 192. “[The troops] appreciated [Fox News Network’s] tone of coverage. Fox was supportive 
of the troops, supportive of the U.S. efforts in the war.” 
39
 Ibid. p. 182. “I asked the duty officer why I wasn’t invited to that briefing…He returned and said, ‘I 
asked the colonel. He said, ‘You know, guys, [Al-Jazeera is] a station with a reputation.’” 
40
 Ibid. p. 98. “[Koppel] had more access to helicopters and vehicles to move around and see things. He 




special correspondent Geraldo Rivera, who was booted from his unit for drawing a 
rough map in the sand suggesting troop position during a live broadcast.
41
 
Section two also addresses the technological limitations of embedding—or, 
rather, the unexpected limitations of having an arsenal of new reporting technology at 
one’s fingertips.  For instance, the units occasionally observed “dark” periods, in 
which all electronic equipment had to be shut down. Deadlines, even for real-time 
television stories, fell victim to the security needs of the military unit. A few days into 
the invasion, all Thuraya brand satellite telephones were confiscated from reporters 
and others because Central Command had received intelligence that the satellite 
encryption codes for that brand of phone had been hacked. Additionally, journalists 
lost laptops, cameras, and satellite phones in combat and by accident.   
Reporters’ stated penchant for allowing the troops to use their communication 
equipment to talk to loved ones at home also compromised unfettered access, and to 
some minds caused a conflict of interest and emotional investment, which is 
discussed in the third section of the paper. The third section looks at some of the more 
amorphous and subjective obstacles to access. Many embedded reporters openly 
admitted that they began to feel affection and kinship with the soldiers in their unit. 
Some would refer to the fighting squads as “we” instead of “they.”
42
  Few embeds, 
however, actually said that their emotional attachment compromised their 
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 Many more said that the limited view of the war afforded by being 
“stuck” with their units was the major factor in producing unbalanced coverage.
44
   
The way that reporters’ coverage was affected by how editors and TV 
channels used and edited the raw filed material will also be discussed in Part III. 
Editors in the print format could make choices as to what parts of the story would run, 
and photo editors could decide not to run pictures if they were too graphic. U.S. TV 
audiences were still eager to see the effects of the war, which may have resulted in 
what some press scholars call the “sanitizing” of war. If all the viewers can see on the 
screen are flashes of light from infrared images of bombing raids, or explosions 
lighting the horizon behind a reporter’s head, they tend to think of aerial 
bombardment as safe, targeted, and tend to ignore the inevitable human cost.
45
 I will 
also address the possibility of a “9/11 effect”—an unquantifiable but increased 
nationalistic sentiment stemming from outrage over the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001. I argue, as do many communication theorists and professional journalists, 
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that effects of 9/11 lingered both in the minds of embeds and on the editors and 
anchors who shaped their stories a year and a half after the event.
46
  
The fourth section concludes the paper with a recap of the various realities 
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Chapter 2: Traditional and Historical Blocks to Access 
 
Vietnam through Gulf War I: Lessons 
Vietnam was the first time in American history in which reporters were subject to 
little or no official government censorship.  In the first years of the war (1961-1965), 
regulations about journalists’ presence and their news product were lax to 
nonexistent.
47
 Formal censorship, such as the system of submission to official 
military censors of all outgoing news stories employed in World War II, was 
considered in 1965 because of heightening coverage of military operations.
48
 The idea 
was eventually discarded. Reporters had only to abide by a list of “ground rules” 
aimed at preserving military security, but could otherwise operate as they chose.
49
  
In any case, restrictions put in place for the purposes of protecting American 
forces have historically met with little resistance from the press, and are unlikely to 
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do so. Such commonsense restrictions include a ban on reporting specific troop 
movements, the state of supply lines and/or reinforcements, and unexecuted battle 
plans. The guidelines that embedded reporters were to review and sign before 
departing for the Middle East to cover operations in March 2003 very closely 
resembled those employed in Vietnam including an acknowledgement that embeds 
would refrain from reporting “[s]pecific number of troops…[s]pecific number of 
aircraft … equipment … ships … [n]ames of military installations or specific 
geographical locations of military units … [i]nformation regarding future operations 
[and]…force protection measures…rules of engagement…[i]nformation regarding 
intelligence collection activities” and more.
50
  Every single embedded reporter signed 
off on these guidelines before taking a unit assignment. Rare indeed is the reporter on 
either side of a conflict who wants to take responsibility for jeopardizing missions by 
inadvertently or intentionally informing the enemy of classified plans. 
In the case of Vietnam, the lack of formal censorship stemmed in part from 
the American government policy against acknowledging official U.S. participation in 
driving back the North Vietnamese.
51
 At the beginning of combat operations in 1961, 
the U.S. Army policy was one of “maximum information” to the press.
52
 Reporters 
had been in Vietnam since even before the Buddhist uprising of 1963 and were well 
established by the time unrest in the country leapt into American public 
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consciousness after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964.
53
 By the time 
censorship may have been considered, conflicting policy decisions had already 
eroded news organizations’ trust in the military and the government. A February 1962 
communiqué from the U.S Information Agency and Department of Defense, known 
as Cable 1006, said that press relations should be conducted with an eye to 
reinforcing the idea that the conflict was a purely South Vietnamese operation, with 
American help on the periphery.
54
 U.S. policymakers, in fact, saw the war on broader 
terms than simply military—seeking to convey a sense of futility for the North 
Vietnamese cause to Communist centers in Peking and Moscow. Amid contradictory 
policy decisions aimed simultaneously at showing determination in the face of the 
North Vietnamese forces and keeping the conflict off the domestic policy agenda, 
MACV on unstable ground as to how to treat the press.
55
 “The U.S. Government is 
prepared to join the Viet-Nam Government in a sharply increased joint effort to avoid 
a further deterioration in the situation in South Viet-Nam,” read the statement, which 
was declassified in 1976.
56
 
 As historian Daniel C. Hallin notes, the fact of sending U.S. forces into 
combat took away some of the government’s ability to control what was “news” and 
what was not. By the time it was released in 1962, Cable 1006 was moot: “In October 
1961…there were only a handful of officials…whom journalists regarded as 
‘authoritative.’ By the next spring the story could be covered from a very different 
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level and perspective—from the perspective of the Americans in the field who were 
fighting and administering [the political agenda].”
57
 
 Judging by retrospectives written by veteran journalists it would appear that 
all reporters want to return to the unfettered access of the Vietnam conflict, while the 
government is working at all costs and sometimes at cross-purposes with the press to 
avoid another Vietnam—at least with regard to war reporting. "Vietnam was the most 
free press exercise in the history of this country," former United Press International 
reporter Joe Galloway told PBS during a retrospective on reporting in Vietnam.
58
 
General William C. Westmoreland, who was commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam 
from 1964 to 1968, essentially substantiated this notion in a Time magazine interview 




 However, unfettered access was only a single factor in a complex brew that 
created the climate of mutual press-military distrust post-Vietnam.  Maj. Gen. Winant 
Sidle, who held various public affairs positions in the Army from 1967 to 1975—and 
whose panel would famously investigate the role of the press in the war in Grenada 
eight years afterward—blamed “lazy” reporters in Vietnam in part for encouraging 
American sentiment to turn against the war. “There were too many reporters 
unwilling to check stories before filing…some believed [the Army] wouldn’t give 
them facts; some felt it was unnecessary to check.”
60
 Certainly, a handful of reporters 
in Vietnam produced one-sided reports because they were afraid to go into combat. 
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“The MACV (accreditation) card would admit the correspondent to the daily briefing 
on the war’s progress given at the Joint United States Public Affairs Office 
(JUSPAO)…If he was prepared to believe JUSPAO, a correspondent could cover the 
war simply by attending the briefings each day.”
61
  
 On the other side of the coin, plenty of correspondents would attach 
themselves to an outgoing convoy and place themselves right in the middle of the 
action—and the danger.
62
  Former CBS Washington producer William Small said, “A 
case can be made, and certainly should be examined, that [seeing the effects of 




As the conflict in Vietnam went on, editors became hungrier for combat 
footage, former Independent Television News (ITN) reporter Richard Lindley said. 
“Before they (the editors) were satisfied with a corpse…then they had to have people 
dying in action.”
64
 Lists of soldiers missing and killed in action would appear on the 
television screen every night, and the evening news was peppered with combat 
footage spliced into stand-up reels filmed in Saigon. And the turnaround for footage 
was quick; noncombatant U.S. citizens on the other side of the world could see what 
was going on with reasonable contemporaneity. CBS television reporter Bob 
Schieffer, who covered Vietnam early in his career, said if the reports were especially 
time-sensitive, reporters asked their news networks to charter a jet and have the film 
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sent a couple of hours away to Hong Kong or Tokyo, where the footage would be 
assembled and sent by satellite to New York.
65
 “In the military it became part of this 
lore that it was the fault of the press that the war turned badly. It wasn’t. The 
American people lost faith and turned on the war because of the casualties.”
66
  
Hallin argues, in contrast, that it was not “lazy journalism,” or the bloody 
consequences of war appearing on television screens, that turned the U.S. public off 
to the war effort. 
67
 It was the perception of the soldiers on the ground that the war 
effort itself was turning sour, a sentiment that television reporters would have picked 
up on by being in such close proximity to the troops.
68
  Speculating on strategy in the 
wake of the 1968 Tet Offensive, Walter Cronkite famously pronounced the operations 
in Vietnam “unwinnable.”
69
 That comment won him, CBS, and news organizations in 
general no paltry number of detractors in the military—but television viewers largely 
came to agree with him.  
 The unprecedented ramifications of war on TV more deeply and completely 
polarized the military and the media. “[T]he Pentagon started blaming the press for 
standing in the way of victory, while the press accused the Pentagon of lying about 
the war,” according to an oral history of the embedding program in Iraq.
70
 A 1995 
study, co-authored by Frank Aukofer of the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel and retired 
Navy Vice Admiral William P. Lawrence, noted that 64 percent of the military 
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officers surveyed in the opinion poll believe strongly or somewhat strongly that news 
coverage of events in Vietnam harmed the war effort. According to Aukofer and 
Lawrence, 70 percent of press representatives entirely disagreed with that 
characterization.
 71
   
With Vietnam, the rift of mistrust between the Pentagon and the press was 
passed to the next generation of reporters and military personnel. Later military 
campaigns launched by the U.S. Department of Defense featured harsh restrictions on 
war coverage.  The U.S. invasion of the small island nation of Grenada, on October 
25, 1983, saw the introduction of the Department of Defense News Media Pool.  The 
group of journalists invited by the Defense Department to form the “pool,” however, 
was not allowed onshore during the initial invasion, was detained on the nearby island 
of Barbados, and was prevented from reporting live from Grenada itself until nearly 
three days after offensive operations began. 
 On October 27, two days after the initial invasion, a small contingent of only 
15 or so reporters from the entire pool—which totaled about 600—were able to take a 
guided tour of the island.  But the Defense Department “grounded the media plane so 
reporters couldn't file their stories until after [President Ronald] Reagan gave a 
speech on the invasion.”
 72
 On Oct. 30, reporters finally enjoyed unlimited access to 
Grenada but had to resort to footage and eyewitness accounts from military sources.  
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 The press’ outcry over this prompted then-Secretary of Defense Caspar W. 
Weinberger to issue the “Principles of Information”: 
“It is the policy of the Department of Defense to make 
available timely and accurate information so that …  
members representing the press, radio, and television may  
assess and understand the facts about national  
security and defense strategy. Requests for information  
from organizations and private citizens will be answered  




Press representatives decided this was too vague—and an excuse to continue 
to withhold information. They drew up their own “Statement of Principles,” released 
in early 1984, demanding that the Defense Department reexamine media access 
during combat operations.  Initial response seemed promising; then-Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John Vessey picked by-then-retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. 
Winant Sidle to head up a committee, the Military-Media Relations Panel (Sidle 
Panel), composed of major press representatives and public affairs officers from the 
Defense Department.  From the Sidle Panel’s recommendations came the 
formalization of the pool system that would be used in the next two major U.S. 
military operations—in Panama in 1989, and again in Iraq in 1991 during the first 
Persian Gulf War. 
Neither engagement worked to the satisfaction of the media, though the Sidle 
Panel report had recommended both access to the media pool and a reliance on media 
agreement to a predetermined set of “ground rules” rather than having each story pass 
through a censorship committee outright. Strategic Studies Institute scholar Pascale 
Combelles-Siegel reported that, during operations in Panama, the military established 
a routine by which pool journalists could file three 600-word dispatches within the 
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first two hours of the pool’s arrival in the combat zone. Pool reporters soon 
complained that their news organizations had taken on considerable expense to send 
them, only to be faced with limited dispatches and long periods of non-newsworthy 
coverage because the reporters could not observe action directly.
74
 
The first war in the Persian Gulf, 1991’s Operation Desert Shield, saw a sort 
of proto-embedding development in the pool system. Pools would move with troop 
units. The Persian Gulf War was not an operation…in which reporters could travel 
the front in jeeps, or like Vietnam where reporters could take a helicopter to specific 
points of action,  then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Pete 
Williams wrote in a March 1991 Washington Post editorial.  “American ground units 
moved quickly – some of them by air. To cover the conflict, reporters had to be part 
of a unit, able to move with it.”
75
 
The problem with this was that pools usually consisted of one representative 
from each of the news media—i.e.: one photographer, one print reporter, one 
television reporter, and one radio reporter. About 1,600 reporters showed up for the 
pools, but only 400 were assigned to pools with units. The rest had to stay at the base 
in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, waiting for reports from the 400 “embedded” pool 
members. “For the 1200 journalists who were not at the fighting…the press pools 
were an unneeded restriction, hampering the coverage of the war,” according to one 
scholar.
76
 Even Vice President Richard Cheney, who served as Secretary of Defense 
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during the first Gulf War, said that the 1991 conflict was the best-covered war in 
history, but acknowledged some of its failings in press relations.  “They (the press 
corps) don’t like this at all. They fundamentally disagree because they felt managed 
and controlled … I also think it’s fair to say it’s a legitimate criticism for them to 
make. Access was very uneven.”
77
 
The Sidle Panel’s “ground rules” formulation would remain a component of 
Defense Department policy up to and including the embedding program used during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  But the pool system failed miserably in the eyes of 
reporters. Both Operations Just Cause in Panama, and Desert Shield in Iraq, 
essentially contravened the recommendations of the Sidle Panel report, so journalists 
cried foul once more.  Journalists gathered to revise the “Statement of Principles,” 
releasing them in August 1992—this time with a condemnation of the pool system: 
“Press pools are not to serve as the standard means of  
covering U.S. military operations. Pools may sometimes  
provide the only feasible means of early access to a military 
operation. Pools should be as large as possible and dis- 
banded at the earliest opportunity (within 24 to 36 hours 
when possible). The arrival of early access pools will  
not cancel the principle of independent coverage for  




The press also made a far more nebulous but still persuasive argument for 
access in the “Principles.”
79
 Journalists argued that their tradition of accompanying 
soldiers on the battlefield was a key pillar of American democracy because it serves 
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the people's right to know.
80
 More importantly, however, the Principles reiterated 
what journalists had been trying to get across since the fallout from Vietnam: the pool 
system and the various ways in which the government strove to make it work from 
1975 into the early twenty-first century, constituted a block to press access to combat. 
 
Moving Toward a New Policy 
By the time of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S., the perception of the 
press by the military, and vice versa, were established and accepted by both parties. A 
law scholar says, “The stereotypes are well-entrenched: a cavalier media chasing a 
scoop regardless of consequences and a short-sighted military sacrificing 
constitutional rights for strategic ends. As a result, embedding appears to put two of 
our most important priorities—protecting free speech and preserving national 
security—into inevitable conflict.”
81
 Zeide notes that this is a vast oversimplification, 
but it is fair to say that the Defense Department was back at the drawing board 
regarding press relations.   
 Shortly after 9/11, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld put his assistant 
secretary for public affairs, Victoria Clarke, in charge of revising the Pentagon’s 
media relations policies in a time of heightened security and national alarm.
82
 Soon 
after the 9/11 attacks, Clarke and Rumsfeld began to meet with the Washington 
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bureau chiefs of various news organizations to discuss strategy for battlefield news 
coverage during any future U.S. military operations. “We are in a whole new world 
here," Clarke said at a September 28, 2001 meeting with news bureau chiefs before 
the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan. “We're 
trying to figure out the rules of the road. We are trying to figure out how to work with 
you, how to make sure you get what you need ... while protecting the national 
security and the safety of the men and women in uniform.”
83
 
 However, full battlefield access was once again denied to reporters during 
operations in Afghanistan. The country was a dangerous place for reporters—
American or otherwise—in 2001 and 2002. For instance, four Spanish and Italian 
reporters were gunned down on the road from Jalalabad to Kabul on Nov. 19, 2001.
84
 
The safety situation was one of the reasons that the Pentagon gave for denying 
reporters access to certain areas of combat. The Defense Department also told 
reporters that most of the operations in the country were being carried out by Special 
Forces troops, and that having a reporter tag along would disrupt operational security 
and eliminate the element of surprise. But the government was actively stalling 
attempts by reporters to reach certain areas and cover certain operations in the 
country, as well. On Dec. 5, 2001, reporters were sequestered in a warehouse after a 
friendly-fire bombing incident that killed five U.S. soldiers and wounded 19, so they 
could not have access to survivors or attending medics.
85
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Press access to operations in Afghanistan also faced legal obstacles. Hustler 
publisher Larry Flynt petitioned Victoria Clarke, Donald Rumsfeld’s assistant 
secretary of defense for public affairs, for permission to send a reporter to accompany 
one or more specific units in Afghanistan.  Clarke rejected Flynt’s request for the 
purposes of security, saying that the majority of troops in the country were small 
special operations units whose objectives may be compromised by the presence of a 
reporter.
86
  Flynt brought suit in November 2001, calling into question the 
constitutionality of the Department of Defense’s refusal.
87
  In his complaint, Flynt 
cited a Defense Department directive stipulating that “open and independent reporting 
be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.”
88
 
Flynt’s claim was dismissed by a district court, after which he appealed the 
case.  The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the 
lower court’s ruling on constitutional grounds, saying that the First Amendment’s 
protection of free speech did not translate into a guarantee of battlefield access for the 
sake of presenting an accurate story to readers.
89
  An appeal to the Supreme Court 
was denied.  Even Flynt’s legal team admitted there was very little standing case 
history to support the idea of a constitutional right to battlefield access.
90
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Legal scholar David A. Anderson has argued what is possibly a more legally 
viable alternative to pleading the constitutionality of journalist access to war zones.
91
 
Anderson’s reasoning rests on legal precedent in the case of a hypothetical claim by 
the press of a right to receive information. In the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in 
Board of Education v. Pico, Justice William J. Brennan wrote that “the right to 
receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own 
rights of speech, press, and political freedom.”
92
 A legal claim, Anderson argues, 
could rest on the idea that the non-press public has the right to receive information—
barring that which would cause immediate harm—from the press on American 
warfare.  In 1971, Justice Hugo L. Black made it clear information on U.S. conduct of 
foreign wars was a constitutionally protected right:  “[P]aramount among the 
responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from 
deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and 
foreign shot and shell.”
93
  
 The right of access to combat in order to provide information has received no 
judicial protection per Flynt v. Rumsfeld, but Anderson suggests that it may be in the 
government’s best interest to grant reporters access to the battlefield when possible. 
The Pentagon agreed—or at least it did prior to 9/11.  Department of Defense 
Directive 5122.5, issued in September 2000, recommends media access to all major 
military units and that journalists should be permitted to ride on military vehicles and 
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with convoys when possible.
94
  In Flynt’s case, it hardly mattered that his appeals 
were denied, however: David Buchbinder, a reporter for Hustler, had already 
deployed to Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan.  Several stories Buchbinder filed 
at Hustler and other publications indicated that he had accompanied troops on at least 
one mission to look for Al Qaeda operatives.
95
 As evidenced in Flynt, the 
sluggishness of the judicial process could have been one of many factors that made 
the Defense Department look to head off further questions of battlefield access at the 
pass, as it were, by instituting the embedding program in full force in 2003.  
 
Embedding 
Because journalists had once again had their expectations for reasonably open 
battlefield access in Afghanistan defeated, the beginning of the military-press 
partnership called “embedding” began in a climate of suspicion, wrote Washington 
Post correspondent Peter Baker. 
96
 The idea of embedding had its roots in 
conversations that took place before Afghanistan, but the nature of the conflict in that 
country turned out to be incompatible with the fledgling plan. “In Afghanistan, for 
weeks all we had were very small numbers of Special Forces on the ground that 
infiltrated into very arduous conditions…which was not conducive to being able to 
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put any significant number of reporters on the ground,” said Bryan Whitman, then the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.
97
 
An Iraq incursion, the Defense Department reasoned, would be a more 
“traditional” war—much more like World War II than Vietnam or Afghanistan, with 
established fronts and overt troop incursions rather than scattered units or secretive 
special-ops missions. The planned structure of the war lent itself to the structure of 
embedding. If another Afghanistan-like conflict faced the U.S. military in the future, 
Whitman said it would once again be hard to duplicate the access opportunities 
granted to reporters in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
98
 
Having very little “friendly” press coverage during campaigns in Afghanistan, 
according to Rumsfeld, caused an unintended consequence—at least in the battle for 
“hearts and minds” in the Afghan countryside.  As Rumsfeld said at one of the 
meetings with bureau chiefs—in October 2002: 
“In the case of … Afghanistan there was a great degree of 
skill on the part of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in news  
management and they were able to co-locate their various 
military activities in close proximity to hospitals and nursing  
homes and schools and sympathy-engendering locations.   
To the extent they couldn’t and some building was bombed,  
they would then take in some cases, actually physically take  
people from a hospital and take them over to a place that was  
bombed and pretend it was a clinic of some kind.  It’s helpful  
to the extent you have people who are journalists and are accurate  




A major concern of Pentagon officials after Gulf War I had been Saddam 
Hussein’s use of Iraqi media to turn the tide of Iraqi sentiment against the American 
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“invaders” by broadcasting graphic pictures of the destruction caused by U.S. 
bombing raids.
100
 Rumsfeld wanted an American perspective on combat operations to 
counter negative publicity by the Iraqis. 
 “Secretary Rumsfeld understood that if the American-led coalition failed to 
leverage the media in [Operation Iraqi Freedom], the enemy might win the 
information battle by using the media to their advantage,” wrote Col. Glenn T. 
Starnes in a 2004 Center for Strategic Leadership paper on the embedding program. 
101
 Rumsfeld decided that, to the extent that it could be done, media would be as close 
to ground operations as possible in Iraq—both to satisfy media representatives and as 
a preventive measure with regard to negative enemy-sponsored propaganda.
102
 The 
Department of Defense, and Rumsfeld in particular, theorized that the war effort 
would benefit in aggregate from the presence of reporters, even if some of the stories 
they reported painted American troops in an unflattering light. “We need to tell the 
factual story—good and bad—before others seed the media with disinformation and 
distortion,” Rumsfeld wrote in a February 10, 2003 Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) 
memo (discussed below and included as Appendix I to this paper). 
Bryan Whitman said the Defense Department began planning the embedding 
program in late summer or early fall, 2002.
103
 Suggestions from the meetings with the 
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bureau chiefs began to shape the program; Secretary Rumsfeld himself was often 
present at these meetings to give briefings to members of the press on his goals and 
objectives.   
 In late 2002 and early 2003, as an invasion of Iraq was more and more 
inevitable, Rumsfeld drafted a memorandum to the public affairs officers who would 
be traveling with the fighting forces during an invasion. It was titled “Public Affairs 
Guidance (PAG) on Embedding Media During Possible Future 
Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Commands Area of Responsibility 
(AOR),” and officially released on Feb. 10, 2003. It was meant to be the official set of 
guidelines for military public affairs officers with regard to embedded reporters.
 104
 
 A 2003 article by Andrew Bushell and Brent Cunningham challenged 
Rumsfeld’s PAG memo, predicting that the promised access and advantages to 
embedding would fall just as flat as former promises made to the media by military 
and Defense Department personnel.
105
 “The published article [by Cunningham and 
Bushell] indicated that our media embed program was just a front—that we would 
never grant the level of access that we said we would give,” said Maj. Tim Blair, who 
served with the Defense Department’s Media Operations division.
106
 
 The policy promises were an improvement over the situation in Afghanistan, 
Bushell and Cunningham wrote: 
“For instance, in Afghanistan reporters were not allowed  
to identify soldiers by name and hometown; in Iraq they  
will be allowed to do so with the soldiers' consent. Also, the  
new ground rules state that the reporters' safety is not reason  
                                                 
104
 Rumsfeld (2003). “Public Affairs Guidance (PAG).” 
105
 Brent Cunningham and Andrew Bushell. “Being There.” Columbia Journalism Review. Apr./May 
2003. http://cjrarchives.org/issues/2003/2/pentagon-bushell.asp.  
106




to exclude them from an operation, and that the standard 
for release of information is Why Not Release?, rather than  
Why Release?  
 
However, they argued: 
 
“The devil … is in the details. The leaked document … is  
intended as a guide for public affairs officers. Specific ground  
rules for each unit, according to Major Tim Blair, the military's  
media contact on embedding, will be established when reporters  
get to their units. ‘And those ground rules will change from  
mission to mission and location to location,’ he says.  
The military's guiding principle on embedding is ‘security  
at the source,’ which essentially means that individual unit  
commanders will have considerable say over what reporters  




 It stands to reason that after decades of mistrust, the policy goals contained in 
the PAG memo may have seemed to writers like Cunningham and Bushell too 
expansive—even permissive—to be true.  The memo promised, among other things: 
• “Media will have long-term, minimally restrictive access to U.S. air, ground, 
and naval forces.” 
• “Media will be given access to operational combat missions, including 
mission preparation and debriefing, whenever possible.” 
• “To the extent possible, space on military transportation will be made 
available for media equipment necessary to cover a particular operation.” 
• “No communications equipment for use by media in the conduct of their 
duties will be specifically prohibited.” 
If the document was to be taken literally, operations in Iraq in 2003 would be 
different from Panama and Grenada in that access would be long-term and with few 
restrictions. It would differ from the first Gulf War in that reporters would not mostly 
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be sequestered at central command, but participate in “operational combat missions.” 
And reporters would not be forced to find their own transportation into the combat 
zone, as in the first weeks of operations in Afghanistan, but would be provided with 
military transport sanctioned for both them and their gear. 
But veteran war reporters say that the gap between what the civilians at the 
Pentagon envision and what goes on in the field under military command can be 
large.
108
 Bushell and Cunningham also took exception to Rumsfeld’s statements 
about using the media as leverage in the PAG memo. Among other things, Rumsfeld 
wrote, “Media coverage of any future operation will, to a large extent, shape public 
perception of the national security environment now and in the years ahead. This 
holds true for the U.S. public; the public in allied countries whose opinion can affect 




Members of the military believed that stating their blunt intention to use the 
media as a promotional device would be unpopular with the press itself.  Just before 
operations began in Iraq, Lt. Col. Margaret H. Belknap, of the U.S. Military 
Academy, cautioned military personnel about media distrust in an article in the 
school’s quarterly journal, Parameters. 
The notion of “using” the media understandably—if not  
invariably—will cause serious concerns for skeptical and  
independent reporters and editors. The intent may not be  
to dupe anyone, however. There is certainly nothing  
sinister implied in suggesting that the military use the  
media as a conduit to accurately and honestly convey  
information to the American people about the operations  
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 As the embedding program was conceived, news organizations or freelance 
reporters would apply for embedding “slots,” which would be doled out in proportion 
to the size of the news outlet. Those journalists given an embedding slot would 
function as part of their assigned unit—eating, sleeping, sharing space, and traveling 
with the soldiers. They would be protected by the unit, but also exposed to the same 
dangers. The PAG memo stipulated that transportation to combat operations should, 
if at all possible, be allowed to any embed requesting it, that Nuclear, Biological, and 
Chemical (with the fitting acronym “NBC”) gear would be provided free of charge to 
embeds. Notably, it said news representatives could be “disembedded” for any reason 
at any time. It also included the following points: 
• “Media are not authorized use of their own vehicles while traveling in an 
embedded status.” 
• “[U]nit commanders may impose temporary restrictions on electronic 
transmissions for operational security reasons. Media will seek approval to 
use electronic devices in a combat/hostile environment.” 
Before the invasion in 2003, former CNN anchor Bernard Shaw saw a problem 
with being beholden to the military as a reporter: “The idea of journalists allowing 
themselves to be taken under the wing of the United States military to me is very 
dangerous. I think journalists who agree to go with combat units effectively become 
hostages of the military.”
111
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 Rumsfeld, in the PAG memo, also strove to demonstrate to the press that 
proximity to troops was not intended to be a proxy for censorship. “These ground 
rules recognize the right of the media to cover military operations and are in no way 
intended to prevent release of derogatory, embarrassing, negative, or 
uncomplimentary information.”
 112
  It was a recognition, at least on paper, that the 
military would have to cede some control over content for a greater scope of 
coverage. Torie Clarke’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs 
essentially said the same: “[T]here will be no specific rule to govern such things as 
civilian deaths or friendly fire incidents. Once again, then, it seems the decision is up 
to the unit commander.”
113
 
Part of what Secretary Rumsfeld hoped for—a reporter-soldier bond that 
would make embeds think hard about printing negative information about the 
troops—came to pass. United Press International reporter Pamela Hess made a 
prescient comment on the issue to TomPaine.com writer Michael Ryan: “Reporters 
love troops. Put us with these eighteen-year-old kids and we just turn to jelly.” It was 
a rather candid and possibly unprofessional sound bite, but nonetheless true, Ryan 
wrote in his response on TomPaine.com: 
“She's right, of course; I've committed the same professional sin 
myself, more than once. No human with an ounce of emotion  
can watch young kids under fire and not respect them, fear  
for them, feel for them …The [Bush] Administration  
understands this all too well."
114
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 However, Bushell and Cunningham’s concern about the role of the unit 
commander in deciding what would be released--and even how to treat the journalists 
who feel compelled to report negatively about the U.S. troops as well as positively—
played a much larger role in limiting comprehensive coverage by individual embeds 
than emotional attachment to the troops ever did. The unit commanders were the 
officials who decided both that Brett Lieberman should be disembedded from his 
unit,
 115
  and that William Branigin should be lauded for his “fair” coverage of a 
civilian shooting.
116
 Differing attitudes and decisions by commanding officers only 
comprised one of the factors that limited embedded reportorial scope during the first 
months of the Iraq War. As later sections of the paper will show, operational 
limitations like filing embargoes and lack of mobility outside the unit narrowed the 
view of embedded reporters. Post-9/11 nationalism and a lack of control over 
editorial decisions also served to prevent the individual embedded reporter from 
transmitting a complete and balanced view of the war effort to news consumers. 
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Chapter 3: New Restrictions, New Considerations 
 
Luck of the Draw 
The embedding program caused certain unforeseen blocks to the individual embedded 
reporter’s access to combat operations. Certainly the embedding agreement between 
the military and journalists that prevented embeds from seeing more than a small slice 
of the war during their assignment.  
One of the first stipulations in Rumsfeld’s February 2003 memo was that 
“media will be embedded with unit personnel at air and ground forces bases and 
afloat to ensure a full understanding of all operations.”
117
 This “full understanding,” 
as the Defense Department saw it, was not to come from the individual reporters in 
each of these air, land, and sea assignments, but from the aggregate of reports by 
embeds. Retrospectives on the embedding program by journalists also acknowledged 
this point.
118
 Nicholas Kulish, who was embedded for The Wall Street Journal with a 
Marine Expeditionary Force light helicopter attack squadron, said the Journal wove 
together coverage by embeds, from Pentagon briefing centers in Qatar and 
Washington and from non-embedded reporters.
119
 
For the individual embed, however, the subject and quality of reporting “from 
the front lines” often depended on how close to the front lines his or her unit was. Part 
                                                 
117
 Rumsfeld (2003). “Public Affairs Guidance (PAG).” 
118
 “Lens Crafters.” The News Media & The Law. Vol. 28, no. 2. (2004). p. 21. “‘Nobody ever 
suggested that the story of the war would only be told through [the embeds’] inherently limited 
perspectives,’ says Katherine Skiba, Washington, D.C., correspondent for the Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel.” 
119
 Nicholas Kulish. “Embed Cred: How close is too close for embedded reporters?” Washington 




of what made the story of Chris Ayres, a London Times reporter embedded with the 
Second Battalion, 11
th
 Marine artillery unit, was that he did end up seeing frontline 
action, including incoming fire, and was deafened by the huge tank-mounted howitzer 
guns that fired at times for more than six straight hours. While his colleague, Janine 
di Giovanni, was writing that reporters were “pulling out their hair with boredom” in 
Iraq’s mostly Kurdish North, Ayres’ unit was seeing almost constant “contact”—the 
Marines’ term for hostile engagement with the Iraqi military.
120
  
Though he did not necessarily think himself so, Ayres was what other embeds 
would have called “lucky” because of his proximity to the action. On the road to 
Baghdad from the South, Ayres’ Marine unit convoy was confronted by a group of 
modified Iraqi trucks with machine guns on top. The trucks did not even get within 
shooting range before the howitzer cannon rounds turned them into charred rubble, 
Ayres reported. Apparently, the Iraqi fighting unit had called for backup, though—an 
entire company of tanks. Having only gotten as far as Al-Diwaniyah, more than 20 
kilometers south of Baghdad, Ayres elected to end his embedding two days after a 
squadron of American F-15 jets destroyed the oncoming tanks less than a half hour 
before they would have been engaged in a full-on battle with the 11
th




 CBS Evening News correspondent Jim Axelrod found himself in a position 
similar to Ayres’—his Army Third Infantry unit was the first to arrive at Saddam 
Hussein International Airport (later renamed Baghdad International) on Apr. 4, and 
the first to arrive in the city of Baghdad itself during the infantry’s so-called “Thunder 
                                                 
120
 Chris Ayres. War Reporting for Cowards. New York: Grove Press, 2005. p. 239. 
121




Runs” into the capital:
122
 “What happened to me and my combat photographer Mario 
de Carvalho, was as much about dumb luck as anything else. We so happened to be 
assigned to a brigade…that was first across the berms and was the tip of the spear.”
123
 
 Some of the print reporters felt that coverage may have suffered because of 
the Pentagon policy on single embedding slots.  Television reporters and camera 
operators were always embedded as a pair, but print reporters were often embedded 
individually, without an accompanying photographer from their news organization. A 
few reporters felt that news agencies’ being forced to send one without the other was 
a mistake. John Koopman, a former Marine and writer for the San Francisco 
Chronicle, said: “[The Pentagon] did a few things that were not exactly conducive to 
the media. For example, they assigned single slots as embedding assignments, but a 
newspaper needs to have a reporter-photographer team working together.”
124
 
 As a result, some individual writers teamed up with photographers in nearby 
units and brokered deals to send pictures and copy jointly to both reporters’ agencies. 
Washington Times photographer Joe Eddins, embedded with the Marine 
Expeditionary Force Forward Services Support Group, collaborated with another 
reporter who was traveling with another Marine combat support unit in the area. “We 
were then at Camp Viper, southeast of Nasiriyah. I would then hook up with Combat 
Service Support Group Eleven, where a reporter named John Bebow from the Detroit 
News and I had struck a deal with our foreign news desks. Because he did not have a 
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photographer there, and I did not have a writer, we were going to trade pictures for 
stories, which made both of our desks very happy.”
125
 
 True to the promise of the PAG memo, there were reporters embedded with 
nearly every military unit deployed in the region. The Defense Department provided 
for a total of 920 embed slots at the outset of the program. Twenty percent of the slots 
were reserved for international news organizations, while 80 percent would go to U.S. 
domestic news media (including 10 percent to local and regional outlets).
126
 News 
organizations submitted around 775 names, but some of these included reporter-
camera operator pairs who filled only one “slot.”
127
 In total, 628 of the final slots 
were taken.
128
 U.S. national media (such as CBS or NBC) took the most slots, with 
212, while sub-national/regional media (i.e.: The Washington Post, the Chicago 
Tribune) took 176. International news sources (Reuters, Agence France-Presse) filled 
153 slots, and foreign non-international media outlets (Al-Jazeera, Philippines TV) 
had 87. Twenty-seven individual news organizations had more than four embedded 
reporters in the field, with the highest number—around 25—going to Reuters News 
Service and the Associated Press.
129
  
 Almost half of the embed slots assigned, 46 percent, were with Army units; 
28.1 percent embedded with Marine units. An additional 14.9 percent were placed 
with Navy units, 9.2 percent with the Air Force, and 1.8 percent with Special 
Operations. These placements ensure that about three-quarters of embed slots were 
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with troops on the ground, while the remaining 24.3 percent of reporters were placed 




Janine Zacharia, a correspondent with the Jerusalem Post, was one of two of 
the paper’s embedded reporters in Iraq—and one of the embeds assigned to a Naval 
air assault unit. The Post had been offered two spots for embedded print reporters by 
the office of the DASD (PA), Victoria Clarke. The PAG memo stipulated that while 
Clarke would assign a number of slots to a particular news agency, it would be up to 
the contact person at that news agency to decide which reporters took which 
assignments.
131
 As it turned out, her colleague was placed with ground troops, while 
Zacharia was embedded aboard the Navy aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt in 
the Eastern Mediterranean Sea off the island of Cyprus. There were 102 naval 
aviators onboard—with maintenance and ship’s crew rounding out the total number 
of people on the “floating city” at 5,000—and absolutely no enemy fire.
132
 The Syrian 
coast is around 500 miles from Baghdad; the high-powered F/A-18 fighter jets could 
make the distance in no time, but there seemed to be little interest or capability from 
even the Iraqi-Syrian border in attacking aircraft carriers.  
 The stories Zacharia filed before the beginning of combat operations had a 
mundane aspect to them, but also a very human angle because she had much more of 
a chance to get to know the troops on the Roosevelt in a social setting. To pass the 
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time, the crew and pilots had pizza nights with non-alcoholic beer, since the ship was 
officially “dry.” They had karaoke events and ice cream socials. Zacharia wrote about 
the strict rules against physical contact between male and female personnel, about 
how the F/A-18 pilots were treated like royalty, and about watching the fighter jets 
come in from dummy bomb runs and landing with 400 feet of artificial “runway” on 
the deck of the aircraft carrier. Zacharia said she had no idea upon taking the embed 
assignment about what to expect on board the ship, let alone suspected that she would 
not witness any of the effects of the combat missions the F/A-18 pilots carried out. 
She wrote that the fighter pilots had even been scheduled to make a few pre-ground 
invasion bombing passes, but that the Defense Department decided against it at the 
last minute, limiting them to practice runs until the beginning of the ground assault.  
  “Once the actual war started, the ship shifted to this night 
  schedule, but life changed very little for the people on board. 
  They were putting real bombs on the planes as opposed to  
  dummies and they were carrying out real missions.” 
Zacharia wrote that toward the end of her 24-day embed, when she felt the stories 
were becoming repetitive, it was time to leave.
133
 
 Another writer embedded with an airborne unit was Los Angeles Times writer 
David Zucchino. Zucchino started with the Army’s 101
st
 Airborne division, but after 
their first mission—an aerial assault at the Saddam Hussein International Airport—
had been scuttled because there was too high a risk that other forces hadn’t taken out 
all of the anti-aircraft missiles around the Baghdad-based airport, he reported the unit 
was basically stuck “guarding the gas station.” It was difficult, he reported, for the 
officers to keep morale up among the troops, who were bored and frustrated. 
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Zucchino did not get to find out whether the unit got to fly its mission to 
Baghdad. He and another reporter from USA Today, Gregg Zoroya, whose satellite 
phone he had been using since his own was lost when his jeep flipped into a canal, 
spoke to another Army division, a Third Infantry unit that had been briefly sitting on 
the 101
st
 air base tarmac.  The unit had done the first run through Baghdad. They 
agreed to let Zoroya and Zucchino “re-embed” with the unit and ride along in the 
Bradley fighting vehicles to Baghdad.
134
 
 Peter Baker, a Washington Post correspondent, was one of a four-reporter 
crew invited to view the war from the headquarters of the 1st Marine Expeditionary 
Force—the central hub known as “Camp Commando” for the 60,000 Marines and 
26,000 British troops who would be fighting the war—at an undisclosed location just 
outside of Iraq. It was a vantage point entirely unlike Ayres’ or Zacharia’s. Baker and 
the other three reporters were allowed access to the Combat Operations Center (COC) 
to watch satellite images of the aerial and ground campaigns as they unfolded. And, 
unlike Ayres and Zacharia, Baker was allowed to see much more than a narrow 
observable slice of the war. All of the conflicting reports from each Marine unit in the 
field were bottlenecked into the war room at the COC; Baker had difficulty 
distinguishing true reports from mistaken initial impressions as the commanders 
handing down orders.  In fact, he said he was bombarded with too much information. 
“The military commanders who always used to tell us that the initial reports are 
nearly always wrong turn out to be right.”
 135
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 Baker’s experiences at the central command hub served to highlight the vast 
differences between military observation and censorship at home base as compared to 
in the field. The ground rules set out in the PAG memo stipulated that if members of 
the press are allowed access to sensitive information that might go beyond the scope 
of what might be included in a briefing or debriefing, the military commanders 
reserve the right to conduct a “security review” of any article the press representatives 
plan to file. In other words, access to sensitive information would be countered by a 
World War II-style system of submission to a censor.
136
 Admittance to the COC fell 
under this provision, but the public affairs officer’s comfort with the policy of “why 
not release?” described by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in the PAG memo, had a 
rocky start, Baker reported.
137
  
“The morning the war started—just hours after we had been reassured the beginning 
of the conflict was still at least a day away—we felt misled. A nasty shouting match 
ensued with the chief public affairs officer, who offered to throw us out if we were so 
dissatisfied.” Shortly after their argument, though, Baker said both the team of 
reporters and the Marine commanders made concessions. The four reporters were 
offered access to the top-secret COC inside the expeditionary forces’ headquarters—
which was moved inside Iraq’s borders shortly after combat operations began—on 
the condition that they submit stories to a security review.  
Baker said that he was initially leery, but that the experience was 
unexpectedly positive. A high-ranking Marine strategist, or the PAO, would read the 
stories and prune sensitive information, but it turned out that very few information 
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embargoes were necessary. “They might ask that we take out a particular location of a 
unit or delete a radio call sign that they wanted to keep secret, but they were 
incredibly professional and made no substantive changes to the files we sent in.”
 138
 
A placement at a major command post did not necessarily come with the same 
kind of information surfeit experienced by Baker. New York Magazine media critic 
Michael Wolff was based at the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) 
outpost in Doha, Qatar during the invasion. “The profoundly interesting thing about 
Doha is that nothing happened,” Wolff said. “I have never been in a situation where 
there were so many reporters so far from anything that was happening.”
139
 The way 
Wolff describes it, an embed slot at CENTCOM was not unlike the pool system 
during the first Gulf War—reporters would get up in the morning, attend press 
briefings, and file stories based on those briefings.  For an average reporter, he 
imagined, the assignment could be tedious and terrible. For a press critic, however, he 
said that he saw things somewhat differently: “I had an unfair advantage in that I was 
not there in Doha covering the war. I had a certain amount of cover, and my cover 
was uncovering the media. I was able to talk about things that they were really not in 
the purview of so many other reporters to talk about.” Despite the fact that “nothing 
happened,” Wolff said he was happy with his embed slot, for reasons that differed 
quite a bit from many straight-on war reporters. He imagined that an embed slot on 
the front lines with a mechanized or infantry division would be claustrophobic, 
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Outside of the COC or CENTCOM, individual embeds found that the degree 
of control imposed varied wildly—from tight and suspicious to none at all.  Often, 
reporters closer to the front lines experienced looser—or no—control, as opposed to 
those who were further away from the center of the action.
141
 
To the credit of the military establishment, access was not outright denied to 
those reporters who rarely or never saw public affairs officials, a tenet of the program 
which was stipulated in the PAG memo.
142
 As the Pentagon had little or no control 
over press access outside of the hypotheticals detailed in the memo, though, some 
embeds found the commanders and public affairs officers in their units more 
permissive than did others. Often, consistency of access and censorship depended on 
the proximity of the public affairs officer to the reporter in question. That is to say, 
the less often that a PAO was available in the unit to mediate between commanding 
officer and embedded reporter, the more likely it was that reporters were subject to 
the caprice of the commanding officer.  
Washington Post reporter Lyndsey Layton, who was stationed on the USS 
Abraham Lincoln in the Persian Gulf, was required to give every interview in the 
presence of a Navy “minder.” The officer noted every one of her questions and each 
of her subject’s replies. She was also banned from the general mess deck, preventing 
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casual interaction with sailors. After five days, Layton complained to Navy 
headquarters in the tiny Persian Gulf island country of Bahrain, managing to get the 
commanding officer onboard to ease the constant monitoring. Even still, when one of 
the Abraham Lincoln’s FA-18 Hornet jets was lost over Iraq, the first reporters 




Despite the Navy officer’s attempts to limit Layton’s reported content, San 
Francisco Chronicle TV critic Tim Goodman argues that it was not physically 
possible to entirely control the information coming from embedded reporters.
144
 Col. 
Guy Shields, a public affairs officer for the Army, concurs: “There was absolutely no 
way to place any spin control. The media were right there. They were reporting.”
145
 
Whether there was anything to report depended in large part on which unit 
reporters were placed with, and—as many journalists assigned to units on the ground, 
the attitude of the unit commander toward press representatives. With a lenient and 
forthcoming unit commander, reporters had incredible freedom—at least in terms of 
access to the activities of the unit and the opinions of the troops therein. Thus, Rick 
Levanthal, a Fox News reporters who had a very accommodating commander and an 
open unit, said: “There was no apparent PAO watching over my shoulder to see what 
I said. I just talked about what I saw, and what I heard, and what was happening 
around me. I did a lot of interviews with Marines, and asked them whatever I felt like 
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asking them. It was wonderful to be able to have the freedom to do that daily.”
146
 
Geoffrey Mohan of the Los Angeles Times similarly reported never having even seen 
a PAO during his embedment, even joking with fellow reporters that the PAOs didn’t 




 The Washington Post’s William Branigin was with the Army’s Third Infantry 
Division when soldiers failed to heed an officer’s command to fire warning shots at a 
speeding civilian vehicle at a checkpoint. The brigade had been forced to open fire 
with a 25 mm cannon. Ten of the Land Rover’s fifteen civilian passengers, including 
five children, were killed. According to Branigin, the division’s captain, Ronny 
Johnson, yelled over the radio to the soldiers who had shot up the van, “You just 
[expletive] killed a family because you didn’t fire a warning shot soon enough!”
148
 
Branigin reported exactly what he saw, despite Pentagon reports to the contrary. “The 




 Covering military mistakes could be a harrowing experience for those 
journalists, like Joe Eddins of The Washington Times whose unit commanders were 
more hostile to press presence. Eddins documented the drowning of four Marines that 
had tried to cross the Saddam Hussein Canal in full uniform and without a safety line. 
When Eddins began taking pictures of the recovery operation in the canal, his point of 
contact, Capt.  Kevin Coughlin, ordered Eddins back into the Humvee. When they 
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returned to base camp after the incident, Eddins phoned his bureau chief and told 
them what had happened. He told the Times he had pictures, though he said he would 
respect the requirement that reporters wait to identify wounded or killed soldiers until 
next of kin could be notified.  
 Nevertheless, the paper’s Pentagon affairs reporter began to call the Defense 
Department, asking questions about the incident. Later, Captain Coughlin approached 
Eddins with the story that the Times had run. He told Eddins that he had been advised 
by the command center not to talk to him or to let anyone else speak to him, either. It 
was clear, Eddins said, that he was being “blackballed.” After the fall of Baghdad, 
when the suspicious commander released Eddins from the unit, he took up with a 
battalion of Marine combat troops who let him take pictures of whatever he chose.
150
  
Ordinary soldiers were much more disposed to appreciating the work of the 
embeds than were the commanding officers. Brett Lieberman, who was ejected from 
his embed slot with a Marine unit over reports of strained supply lines and 
understaffed humanitarian missions, said that the low-ranking Marine grunts were 
upset that he had been forced to leave the unit. “They kept saying things about 
freedom of the press. They thought it was bogus.”
 151
 Lieberman ended up being back 
in Kuwait along with Geraldo Rivera. Rivera was a former correspondent for Fox 
News who was being disembedded from the Army’s 101
st
 Airborne Division for 
drawing a map of the area the troops were occupying while broadcasting live.
152
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 A couple of reporters found themselves either granted more access or denied it 
because of their affiliation with a particular news organization, though by and large 
this was not the rule. Rick Levanthal, also of Fox News, found the attitude of the 
Second Battalion, 23
rd
 Marines to be particularly welcoming because of the station’s 
reputation for on-air support of the war effort and of the troops. Of course, network 
affiliation was not a guarantee of free rein, as demonstrated by Rivera’s actions, but 
many young soldiers told Levanthal they identified with the tone of coverage 
embraced by Fox. For instance, the network used “Operation Iraqi Freedom”—the 
U.S. government’s name for the conflict, and used an American flag as a backdrop 
for reports by correspondents and for footage of the troops in action, journalist 
Jacqueline E. Sharkey said. “Fox anchors and correspondents expressed their views 
about many aspects of the conflict. One anchor reporting on the search for Saddam 
Hussein asked, ‘Did we get him?’ Commentators made disparaging remarks about 
guests and news organizations that raised questions about the conflict.”
153
 This 
reputation did not bother Levanthal. “I’d rather have [U.S. soldiers] like us than 
dislike us. I mean, if I have a choice of being with a network they didn’t want around 
versus a network that they did, I think I’d choose being with a network they did want 
because we’re going to get better access.”
154
 
 Correspondent Mercedes Gallego, who filed both for the Bilbao (Spain)-based 
newspaper El Correo and Telecinco—a news station based in the Basque region of 
the country—said that the soldiers in her unit, the First Marine Battalion, 
Headquarters Unit, were just generally intolerant of any statement they perceived as 
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 News organizations with a reputation—either perceived or real—of being 
hostile to the American war effort, sometimes saw their embedded reporters denied 
access to critical briefings. Amr El-Kakhy, a reporter for the Arabic-language news 
service Al-Jazeera, said he was denied access to a briefing due to his network 
affiliation. He and his cameraman were excluded from a briefing on future operations, 
he said, while reporters from Reuters, the Associated Press, and CNN were allowed 
into the briefing room. When he asked duty officer why he was excluded from the 




 Al-Jazeera did become known from the first days of the war for its willingness 
to show footage of casualties—even shots of American wounded and dead that the 
U.S. networks declined to show, even after the 72-hour embargo period on releasing 
the identities of slain soldiers was over. According to a study of TV broadcasts during 
the first few weeks of the war, Al-Jazeera aired more stories about Iraqi civilian 
casualties and war protests than the three domestic U.S. news networks (ABC, CBS, 
and NBC), as well as CNN and Fox News Channel.
157 
Al Jazeera’s former 
spokesman—now communications director for the Dubai-based and Saudi-owned TV 
channel Al-Arabiya—Jihad Ali Ballout, told National Public Radio that television 
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“would be deceiving its audience” were it to censor “any of the information that 
actually makes people aware of all aspects.”
 158
 All in all, although the network aired 
more stories (10.6 percent) that were critical of military actions in Iraq than all of the 
other surveyed networks combined, the study says about 89 percent of news spots 
aired on Al-Jazeera were neutral in tone.
159
   
 Regardless of network or newspaper affiliation, some reporters who enjoyed 
national name recognition tended—as they always have—to get better access and 
greater mobility because of that “star power.” The most prominent example, one 
noted by several reporters, was that of ABC News’ Ted Koppel, an anchor for the 
popular Nightline evening news program. Koppel was embedded with a unit of the 
Army’s Third Infantry Division, but by virtue of his famous name, some reporters 
said, he could essentially hitch a ride with any departing unit to get closer to the 
action. Fellow Nightline correspondent Mike Cerre said that attendant to Koppel’s 
relative fame was the opportunity to see the “big picture” of the war, rather than just 
the narrow slice afforded less well-known reporters.
 160
  
 The effect of Koppel’s star power was not lost on Jim Axelrod, who worked 
with Nightline rival program CBS Evening News: 
  “Ted Koppel was also with the Third Infantry. He had 
  the run of the joint. The Third Infantry is divided  
  into three combat brigades, so Koppel could sit at in- 
  fantry headquarters and say, ‘Hey, you know the Second 
                                                 
158
 Sharkey (2003). “The Television War.”  
159
 Aday, Livingston, and Hebert (2005). “Embedding the Truth.” Table 3: CBS and Fox News aired 
no critical stories during the sample time period (1,820 stories total from Mar. 20 to Apr. 20, 2003); 
2.2 percent of ABC stories were critical of military actions, 1 percent of NBC’s, and 3.9 percent of 
CNN’s stories (between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m.) were critical in tone. Only 0.2 percent of Al-Jazeera 
stories were supportive of the war effort. 
160
 Katovsky and Carlson (2003). Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq. p. 98. “[Koppel] had more 
access to helicopters and vehicles to move around and see things. He could report on the grand scheme 




  Brigade seems to be taking on some good fighting for  
  the next forty-eight hours. Let’s go with them.’ …I was  





As embedding as a policy came into full force in the Iraq War, a number of on-the-
ground practical limitations to coverage confronted reporters. Though some were due 
to the limits of technology or of circumstance, many others were unique to the Iraq 
conflict simply because of the structure of the embedding program. Many journalists 
found that despite the absence of a PAO or other potentially censoring human force, 
circumstances such as mode of transportation, the speed at which the unit moved—
even the weather—became an impromptu censor. 
 Some embeds literally saw a small slice of the war—at least while within the 
confines of a Bradley armored vehicle and its almost medievally small slit-like 
viewing windows.  David Zucchino wrote: 
  “Riding around in a Bradley is very claustrophobic and 
  confusing … it was incredibly loud, hot, stifling; there’s 
  just no air inside and your only view is through these little 
  glass vision blocks that are maybe three inches high and six, 
  seven, eight inches wide. It’s a prison in there. It’s hard to  
  see what’s going on with all the smoke and the craziness 
  and speed.”
162
 
 One of the more frustrating aspects of moving quickly toward the capital, 
many journalists said, was the inability to stop and assess the situation on the ground, 
or get an idea of the effect the troops’ movements were having on the surrounding 
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villages on the road to Baghdad. Good journalism involves thinking, observing, and 
looking around, according to a communication scholar who insists that the luxury to 
stop and think, to observe comprehensively, was denied when military units moved 
too fast to allow reporters to gather the proper context..
163
 Newsday reporter Graham 
Rayman, embedded with the Eighth Marine Corps Engineers, expressed frustration 
about the unrelenting pace of the missions: “I wish we could just stop for a minute, 
and I could ask around, but that was one of the bad things about the embedding 




 Since the PAG memo specifically bars journalists from traveling in civilian 
vehicles while they are embedded, there is no way to return to a village the unit has 
passed or to cross back over the border if the unit has returned to base camp outside 
Iraq.
165
 “There were reporters I knew who were upset because they couldn’t get 
[military] transportation to go talk to other people about what was happening,” Dallas 
Morning News columnist Jim Landers said. “The commanding officers wanted us to 
let them know where we were, if we left the unit. It just didn’t seem that it was worth 
it to move about.”
166
 
Embeds saw the ordnance that their units fired at unknown enemy targets. 
They heard the relentless pounding of the guns and saw the mortars explode in flashes 
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of light on the horizon.
167
 What was less visible—and sometimes invisible—was the 
effect of the U.S.-led coalition’s assault on the surrounding Iraqi countryside. A study 
by the Project for Excellence in Journalism that examined 40.5 hours of embedded 
coverage by five cable and network news channels found that about half of the reports 
from embedded journalists showed combat action, but none of the stories surveyed 
depicted people hit by weapons.
168
  “That is the problem with a high-tech war,” said 
Peter Baker of the Washington Post. “In some ways it may seem more bloodless than 




Units’ relative detachment from their targets also provided military 
commanders with a convenient excuse to prevent embeds from covering Iraqi civilian 
casualties. Ron Harris of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, who was embedded with the 
Seventh Marine Division, said that one of the unit officers once forbade him to 
investigate the wreckage of a car on which the unit had opened fire a short time 
before. “A sergeant major specifically told us that if we went to look, he would leave 
us at the site.”
170
 
Limited movement and restrictive commanding officers were some of the 
reasons approximately 1,200 reporters opted out of the embedding program and 
decided to pursue stories outside of the purview of the military’s “ground rules.” The 
Pentagon only imposed ground rules and a limited number of slots on embedded 
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reporters; non-embedded journalists—or “unilaterals”—were much more like the 
reporters in Vietnam, who, with proper visa documentation, could come and go from 
the country as they pleased and travel where the wanted. Mohammed Fahmy, a 
translator and driver for reporter Mark Magnier and photographer Brian Walski of the 
Los Angeles Times, said his charges harbored a fierce pride in being unilateral rather 
than embedded: “[Magnier, Walski, and I] had more freedom. We got more 
humanitarian stories. We were able to go to the families’ houses. The embedded 
journalists were just covering the army and how the war was going on.”
171
 
However, a number of military spokespeople and journalists said that some of 
the unilaterals’ pride evaporated after having been witness to combat situations.
172
 
Unilaterals, unlike embeds, were allowed to use civilian vehicles to travel the 
country. However, Pentagon policy guidelines said that non-embedded media 
vehicles were not allowed to join military convoys.
173
 Even though many large news 
organizations spent a great deal of money outfitting their civilian vehicles with the 
same paint jobs and markings as military Humvees in order to avoid being mistaken 
for Iraqi resistance fighters, they would still attempt to take cover with the fighting 
units during skirmishes. Some were allowed to follow the convoys, while others were 
turned away and forced to retreat because commanders did not want to be responsible 
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for the lives of reporters not embedded with their units.
174
 The European 
Broadcasting Union even reported that British and U.S. forces in southern Iraq 
sometimes detained unilaterals or sent them out of the country for going unescorted 
into the war zone.
175
 
The advantage of safety was definitely on the side of the embeds in the 
conflict, though along with that guarantee came limits on access to possible stories.
176
 
(The advantage of increased protection did not guarantee a reporter’s safe return. 
Nine embedded and unilateral journalists were killed in March and April of 2003, 
including ITN correspondent Terry Lloyd (unilateral)—who may have been the 
victim of U.S. friendly fire—Al-Jazeera correspondent Tareq Ayyoub (unilateral), 
and Christian Liebig (embedded) of Germany’s Focus magazine. Photographer Taras 
Protsyuk (unilateral) was killed in a friendly-fire attack on Baghdad’s Palestine Hotel, 
and the Atlantic Monthly’s Michael Kelly (embedded) was killed in a car accident 
south of the Baghdad airport.
177
) Even unilaterals who informally joined convoys for 
protection saw their flexibility to cover events diminished. James Hill, a contracted 
                                                 
174
 Katovsky and Carlson (2003). Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq. p. 393. “Eventually the whole 
convoy stopped because the commander wanted to find out who these guys were who came along 
without their permission…the commanding officer comes over and says, ‘You can’t stay with our 
convoy. You have to leave at first light. If you try to follow us, then we’ll…’ He just trailed off.” 
175
 “EBU protests against reporting restrictions in southern Iraq.” European Broadcasting Union. Apr. 
2, 2003. www.ebu.ch/news/press_archive/press_info_22003_63_irak.php.  “‘US Central Command 
policy is now actively restricting independent newsgathering from Southern Iraq,’  EBU Secretary 
General Jean Stock said in a statement.  ‘Reporters and camera crews who put their lives at risk have 
been detained by American and British troops and returned to Kuwait.’ Mr. Stock said that this 
treatment appeared to be aimed in particular at organizations from countries which had chosen not to 
participate in the American-led coalition. ‘As a result journalists are now exposed to a much greater 
risk and the coalition policy targets the quality of their reporting,’ he said.” 
176
 Katovsky and Carlson (2003). Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq. pp. 73-78. “There was one 
young rookie photographer … As I was walking by, he asked, ‘Sir, can I talk to you? My editors have 
ordered me across the border tomorrow. What do I do?’ I said, ‘Shit, don’t go!’ He said, ‘It’s my job. I 
got to go.’” Also: pp. 1-10. “The unilaterals—a lot of them lost their cojones when they got up there. 
They wanted to be unilateral; they wanted to run around and have the freedom of unilaterals until they 
got into Baghdad, and then they jumped in [with the troops].” 
177





freelance photographer for The New York Times, was technically not embedded, but 
he joined a Marine unit—in which he was allowed to ride in his own Jeep—three 
days after the official start of military operations. Hill was not injured while working 
as a unilateral, but noted that his options for independent excursions narrowed once 
he informally agreed to military protection by joining up with the unit.
 178
 New Yorker 
reporter Jeffrey Goldberg declined an embed slot, and instead chose a unilateral 
position because he believed that the slot offered him would not allow him to see 
anything of consequence. “The real danger is not being killed, but being seriously out 
of position.”
 179
 This mispositioning often resulted in reports from embeds with one 
branch of the military conflicting with those from another branch, said Mark Seibel, 
who worked as international managing editor at Knight Ridder news service’s 
Washington Bureau during the initial incursion into Iraq, said that reporters 
embedded with different branches of the military often reported different things. “The 




 Receiving conflicted reports from journalists in the field did not necessarily 
mean that the reports were wrong. Both the Army and the Marine Corps after-
operations assessments noted that embeds had provided the most accurate coverage of 
operations, at least on the battlefield.
181
 Embeds seemed to have a “line in” on 
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accurate battle reports that journalists working from the U.S. at the Pentagon or at 
CENTCOM did not have. When an enormous sandstorm enveloped Army troops 
around the Iraqi city of Najaf, only the embedded reporters knew—due to pre-war 
briefings—that the division planned to stop around that point to refit and refuel. 
“Media outside Iraq immediately began suggesting a ‘quagmire’ and flawed plan,” 
the Army’s Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) “After Action” report stated.
182
  
Jim Crawley, a reporter embedded with a nearby Marine unit, confirmed the 
“operational pause,” with his paper, the San Diego Union Tribune, because his unit 




 This is not to say that all of the reports emerging from embedded reporters in 
the field were accurate, either. Embeds were subject to spin from the military 
commanders in their units—and without a way to independently investigate the 
effects of the unit’s actions, officers’ accounts had to serve as verification. Todd 
Morman of the Independent Weekly wrote, “Embedded journalists … skilled as they 
may be, have very little to work with aside from the data immediately in front of them 
or what they’re spoon-fed from nearby officials.”
 184
  For instance, journalists said the 
southern city of Basra, under siege by British troops, was taken on March 23, when in 
fact it took the coalition forces until two weeks after that date to subdue resistance.
185
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 National Public Radio’s John Burnett himself told of seeing firsthand just how 
official reports given to embeds may differ from the actual situation on the ground. A 
week after the fall of Baghdad, he disembedded himself and hired a driver and 
translator to investigate the effects of a 500-pound precision-guided bomb on the 
village of Taniya, southeast of Baghdad. The after-mission reports had said that only 
tanks and tracked vehicles in the area had been destroyed, while Taniya residents told 
Burnett that 31 civilians had been killed in their beds by the bombing.
186
 Burnett’s 
experience served to demonstrate the military-created insulation from the larger 
picture that surrounded embedded reporters. Ironically, the effects of this insulation 
were most noticeable in connection with the flood of cutting-edge technology that 
reporters had at their disposal in order to cover the war. Even with real-time satellite 
television uplinks, satellite phones, e-mail filing, and portable “lipstick cameras” that 
could be mounted on the helmet of a soldier charging into battle, the structure of the 
embedding program put unforeseen limits on the use of technology that further 
precluded full coverage of the war. 
 As was the case with mobility, use of technology was often sacrificed to the 
cause of operational security. Per the PAG memo, embedded reporters were promised 
transportation of their communication gear.
187
 This meant that the portable satellite 
dishes, cameras, tripods, laptops, battery packs, and backup cameras were all 
welcome. However, at least in the case of the embedded reporters and those 
unilaterals who chose to take up with convoys, equipment had to be both packed and 
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unloaded at the pace at which the military unit moved. News crews traveled fast, but 
they did not travel light.
188
 In the case that reporters could not transmit using their 
own equipment, the PAG memo stated that military communication equipment could 
be used, as long as filing stories did not interfere with critical communications.
189
   
The rules also stipulated, though, that a ban on electronic equipment use or 
transmission could be put into effect by unit commanders in order to avoid 
compromising operational security and tactical surprise.
190
 Several embedded 
journalists told of having experienced frustrating filing delays and even a limit on the 
use of flashlights, non-uplinked laptops, or even reflective clothing in the interests of 
stealth.
191
 “When we opened our laptops and tried to write stories at night, the 
gunnery sergeant would bellow, ‘Turn that fucking light out before you get your 
[head] shot!’” reported NPR’s Burnett in the Columbia Journalism Review.
192
 
 Even during hours in which the communication ban was lifted, Boston Herald 
reporter Jules Crittenden said, simple logistics often got in the way of being able to sit 
down and file a story—by laptop, phone, or otherwise. Crittenden wrote that his 
satellite phone got no reception through the thick walls of the Bradley Fighting 
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Vehicle in which he was traveling, and that the refueling and rest stops were 
completely consumed by eating, stretching, and entrenching impromptu toilets.
193
  
A number of journalists lost use of their satellite phones because of a security 
snafu in the early days of the incursion. Phones manufactured by the United Arab 
Emirates-based satellite communication company Thuraya integrated a satellite-based 
global positioning feature. The military had received intelligence that some of the 
GPS codes had been sold to the Iraqis, and that they could use the phones to track the 
position of troops via the embedded reporter using the Thuraya phone. All handsets of 
that make were confiscated, leaving some of the journalists who used exclusively that 
brand in the lurch.
194
 CNN correspondent Martin Savidge said that his news 
organization had had the foresight to outfit its reporters with three brands of satellite 
phone as well as “old-fashioned” videophones. Despite this seeming technological 
advantage, Savidge said that the First Battalion Marine unit’s restrictions on when 
and where he could film often clashed with the mission of his 24-hour news 
network.
195
 Since the TV crew could only work in daylight for fear of Iraqi troops 
seeing the lights from cameras and monitors at night, Savidge said that his team often 
could not put together comprehensive, planned, and pre-written segments on the 
war’s progress, but were limited to a blow-by-blow account of the unit’s operations as 
they unfolded. “[W]hat you ended up with was just an of-the-moment what the unit 
was doing,” Savidge said. “What I thought was lacking in the coverage was that sort 
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of depth, putting it into perspective and adding the fabric of the story.”
196
 Savidge’s 
complaint—especially as a television reporter—was echoed by former embeds and 
media scholars alike, and reflects on the larger context of the war as it was received 
by the viewing American public. “Some journalists believe technology led television 
to focus on images instead of information.”
197
 
 There emerged an even more fierce debate over the type of images that were 
shown, even as early as the first days of the war. Many of the embedded reporters 
came to realize that their embed slots afforded them long periods of drudgery and 
confinement, punctuated by brief moments of utter terror. When not engaged in a 
firefight, London Times reporter Chris Ayres said that the commander briefing the 
press corps in Kuwait had been right in his assessment that the campaign would be 
“like the worst camping trip of your life.”
198
 The reporters slept in ditches, crammed 
in vehicles, and behind the treads of huge tanks in the freezing desert night, ready to 
move at a moment’s notice. They ate calorie-laden packaged meals, dug trenches for 
toilets, and had sand ground into the keyboards of their laptops, their clothes, even the 
creases of their hands because of blinding sandstorms. These sandstorms disabled a 
number of military units and their embeds on the road to Baghdad in March 2003. 
Television reporter Dean Staley of the ABC News affiliate KSTP-TV in 
Minneapolis/St. Paul, who was embedded with another battalion of the Army’s 101
st
 
Airborne, told of the relentless storms that lashed the unit and kept its Black Hawk 
helicopters grounded. Adverse weather conditions did little to stifle the creativity of 
the reporter, though, Staley said. He filed a couple of stories on the storms 
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themselves, which aired on the Weather Channel, including one about the efforts to 
locate a patrol that went missing.  It turned out they had been “lost” only about half a 
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Chapter 4: Obstacles to Objectivity 
Some caution and clarification is needed to proceed with the argument that objectivity 
by embedded reporters was threatened during the first several exhilarating weeks of 
the military incursion into Iraq. For the purposes of this paper, “objectivity” will be 
defined here as the ability of the individual reporter to recognize the presence of 
emotional ties to their subjects, propaganda on the part of the government, bias by 
their news organizations, and/or their own limited view of the war, and compensate to 
the best of her ability. 
 One of the greatest fears in the journalistic community about the embedding 
program before its inception was that the American news media would end up “in 
bed” with the military, happily going along with the official account of the war’s 
progress as the publicity branch.
200
 On the whole, though, journalists disagree over 
whether embedded reporters ended up entirely beholden to—and cowed by—military 
information and military might.
201
 Still, a number of reporter accounts and studies of 
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(mainly broadcast) news reports from embedded journalists substantiate the idea that, 
at least in some respects, the intimacy of embedment precluded keeping a clear eye 
and a level head about coverage. 
 Anna Badhken of the San Francisco Chronicle said that one thing she fears 
about embedding is that it will become the “only way” for reporters to cover a war, 
which will inherently bias journalists toward the subjects they cover. “[I]t is hard for 
a reporter, any reporter, to be critical of people he or she travels with and shares his or 
her daily meals. In a war zone, your travel companion becomes your closest friend; 
can we be totally unbiased when our friends have accidentally … shot a bunch of 
civilians in a bus and we have to cover the story?”
202
 
 While many news stories focused on the sometimes fatal errors of judgment 
by military personnel, the cumulative effect of traveling, eating, sleeping and 
commiserating with troops blurred the line of professionalism between source/soldier, 
and friend in at least a few instances.
203
 “Bonding may have taken place,” 
acknowledged U.S. Army Public Affairs Officer Col. Guy Shields. A 2006 study of 
48 stories by six individual embedded print journalists showed that the tone of 
coverage overwhelmingly positive in reference to the daily lives and habits of the 
soldiers, and openly admiring of laudable traits like courage, optimism, and 
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 In only a couple of instances, though, did individual reporters say that 
their own objectivity was compromised.
205
 More often, journalists said that they had 
to be careful about how they framed their relationships with the soldiers in print or 
during a broadcast in order to refrain from seeming compromised.
206
 To this end, 
CNN senior editors warned their embedded reporters not to refer to the troops 
collectively as “we”—rather the more impersonal “they.”
207
  
 The effects of this policy were documented in an analysis of self-references—
instances of “I” and “we”—in live battlefield coverage by embedded television 
network correspondents over the course of 16 broadcast hours on CNN from March 
22 to March 25, 2003. Park and Fox demonstrated that embedded correspondents 
referred to themselves significantly more often during the course of a stand-up 
segment than did non-embedded reporters. “[Non-embedded] reporters referred to 
themselves on average once per story,” Fox and Park write. “This might be expected 
of a reporter in the field to establish his or her location, or in direct response to a 
question from the news anchor, but the repeated use of I by embedded reporters in 
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their stories indicates that they not only established themselves in the field but placed 
themselves in the story itself.”
208
 Conversely, though, the authors found that the 
network’s non-embedded reporters—who had not received the same caution about the 
use of collective personal pronouns—more often used the “we” in reference to the 
troops and reporters as a whole than did CNN embeds.
209
  
 Among the accounts of the embedded experience surveyed for this paper, far 
more reporters expressed concerns with the ethical dilemmas of living “as a 
soldier”—albeit unarmed—while embedded with a fighting unit than expressed doubt 
about their ability to effectively cover the events they observed. One of the 
ambiguities faced by embedded reporters—though largely seen by these reporters as 
ethically non-threatening—was the use of their communication equipment by the 
soldiers in their units. Nicholas Kulish of The Wall Street Journal told of his e-mail 
inbox being flooded with greetings from friends and family for Marines after the unit 
had imposed a communication cut-off shortly before the beginning of the invasion in 
March 2003: 
  “[T]he messages I received were rarely about the  
  stories … Instead it was personal. ‘Is my husband okay?’ 
  ‘Say hello to Bob.’ ‘Can you tell me how he’s doing?’  
  ‘Is everyone safe?’ ‘Please give him a hug for me.’ I 
  wasn’t sure what would have happened if I’d tried to give 
  a macho Cobra helicopter pilot a hug, so I didn’t follow 
  through on that one, but a lot of the other messages were 
  answered and greetings passed on. I sometimes felt like 
  the squadron’s designated Red Cross representative.”
210
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Gerry Barker and Chris Kelley, editors at Belo Interactive Media—which administers 
a number of local television station-affiliated Web sites nationwide—said that a 
project set up by the Dallas Morning News allowed members of the military to post 
photos and messages for friends and family via the paper’s online site.
211
 
 Several reporters also said they faced tough decisions as to how involved they 
could get in the activities of the unit before they felt their journalistic integrity was 
compromised. Jim Landers, an embedded reporter for the Dallas Morning News, said 
that he had to mentally catalogue the possible ethical ramifications when asked to 
relieve the soldier holding the IV bag for a wounded Iraqi. In the end, Landers 
decided to take over holding the bag so that the soldier who had been doing the job 
could return to his unit.
212
 
 Dr. Sanjay Gupta, a neurosurgeon and health correspondent for CNN, had 
media ethicists questioning his choice when he elected to operate on a two-year-old 
Iraqi child who had received a grave head wound after U.S. troops fired on the taxi in 
which the child rode at a checkpoint.
213
  Dismissing the criticism outright, Gupta 
declared that he was “medically and morally obligated to help” because the medical 
team did not have a resident neurosurgeon.
214
 
Perhaps the most pronounced instances of getting caught up in soldierly life 
happened when embeds were confronted with the ethical ambiguity of handling 
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weapons when in life-threatening situations. St. Louis-based radio journalist Charlie 
Brennan, who was embedded with the U.S. Army V Corps, reported that he had a 
sergeant major attempt to hand him semi-automatic pistol during an incursion into 
Nasiriyah during the second full day of combat operations.
215
 Brennan, citing the 
PAG memo’s ground rules, which stipulated that “[m]edia embedded with U.S. forces 
are not permitted to carry personal firearms,” rebuffed the soldier’s repeated offering 
of the firearm.
216
 After the incident, the immediacy of the danger and his ethical 
obligations to his family made Brennan reconsider and terminate his embed 
assignment when the V Corps was still 100 miles from Baghdad. “Most embedded 
journalists found very quickly that they had no ability to control the level of jeopardy 
to which they were exposed.”
217
  
 Gordon Dillow of the Orange County Register admitted that he accepted a 
weapon from one of Alpha Company, First Battalion, Fifth Marine Regiment’s 
members. During a skirmish with rocket-propelled grenade-carrying Iraqis on the 
outskirts of Baghdad, Dillow said, a Marine handed him a hand grenade. “I would 
rather have had an M-16,” he said. Though he never deployed it, Dillow said he held 
onto the grenade until it became clear that he could not write and hold the weapon at 
the same time. Again, Dillow was one of the few embeds who readily admitted a 
situational bias stemming from living with the troops. “It always amuses me when 
reporters say, ‘Oh, you know, I have no feelings about an issue,’ or ‘I’m totally 
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objective,’” he said. “I don’t see how anybody can do it. That’s what editors are for—
to make sure that your copy comes out objective.”
218
 
 Dillow’s reliance on editorial intervention was echoed by a number of embeds 
and analysts of the embedding program. As it happened, the haphazard 
contextualizing of raw information from embeds “at the tip of the spear” by editors in 
both the print and broadcast media proved to be one of the greatest ideological 
impediments to comprehensive coverage by embedded reporters during the war, 
which will be demonstrated in the following section. 
 
Editorial Inconsistency, Home-Front Bias, and the “9/11 Effect” 
Despite the relatively objective—though limited—observations of embedded 
reporters being transmitted to television news stations and editorial desks throughout 
the world, the inconsistency of editorial treatment and tone when the reports had 
passed out of embeds’ hands proved an enormous obstacle to the American public 
receiving the full scope of war coverage. The inability of Washington sources to 
combat Pentagon spin combined with jingoism informed in part by the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 further limited the scope and reach of the reporting done by 
embeds.  
                                                 
218






One factor that allowed print reporting to come away from its Iraq coverage with 
fewer accusations of bias or blatant cheerleading was that reporting in newspapers 
and magazines was able to offer more in-depth coverage of the war. Stephen Hess, a 
former war correspondent now with the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., 
said that “the war has been superbly reported by newspapers. The stories have been 
rich in variety, coming at this from so many different angles.”
219
 
However, the print medium as a whole was not exempt from the 
propagandism that scholars accused news organizations of perpetrating, as evidenced 
by a military press officer speaking to NPR’s John Burnett. Standing by the mess hall, 
the PAO said to Burnett while scanning a color spread on preparations for battle in 
Time magazine, “Money can’t buy this kind of recruitment campaign.”
220
 New York 
Times correspondent Chris Hedges contended that the supportive tone of newspaper 
coverage came from print embeds’ inability to look at Iraq through any other lens 
than that of the military: “That’s a very distorted and self-serving view.”
221
 After 
major combat operations ceased, the Times acknowledged as much, publishing a 
front-page admission on May 26, 2003 that balanced coverage had been sorely 
lacking during the buildup to, and in the first few weeks of, the Iraq War.
222
  “I think 
all the media … we went with the wave of trying to tell the story, but we weren’t 
going against the American authorities,” said Michel DuCille, picture editor for The 
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Washington Post. Much like the New York Times, the Post published a front-page 
acknowledgement in August 2004 that it had not given fair treatment to stories that 




Because the embedded reporters knew that they could only provide a narrow 
slice of the war from a limited vantage point, said Knight-Ridder managing 
international editor Mark Seibel, editors were at the mercy of reporters in Washington 
to give stories context.
224
 However, reporters in both Washington and Qatar said that 
bureaucracy and Pentagon spin often hampered their ability to verify reports from 
embedded journalists on the ground. Alicia C. Shepard said that Pentagon 
correspondents were often “stonewalled by military officials who promised to get 
back to them in a few hours, or even a few days, about a skirmish just reported by an 
embedded colleague.” Shepard also noted that many journalists working away from 
the front lines were frustrated with the seeming unwillingness of Army Brig. Gen. 
Vincent Brooks—who often conducted CENTCOM press briefings in lieu of the 
then-commander Gen. Tommy Franks—to elaborate on reports by embeds in the 
field.
225
 “Editors had to decide who was right,” said San Diego Union-Tribune embed 
Jim Crawley. “Do they believe the reporter talking to the Pentagon, or do they believe 
the reporter on the ground being shot at?” Because of ground-level spin and 
distortion, though, not even the embeds’ accounts could be relied upon entirely.
226
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The “9/11 Effect” 
The problem with the embedding program, argues one scholar, was not that the 
embedded reporters were “looking through a soda straw,” or seeing the war from a 
very narrow point of view informed only by direct interaction with soldiers and action 
reports from unit commanders. Fisher contends that the embeds were looking through 
a distinctly “American soda straw.”
227
 Many embedded reporters said that they were 
able to identify inherent bias toward the U.S. and American activities.
228
  Newsweek 
reporter Kevin Peraino said that the magazine has a staff of senior writers and editors 
who were good at rooting out bias in embedded reporters’ copy. “The writers we have 
in Washington…are very effective in crafting pieces in a way where they’re not 
casting a one-sided light on it.”
229
 By positing a “9/11” effect, I do not aim to 
disprove a pro-American slant among embeds, but to argue that they were 
shortchanged by an amplification of pro-Americanism—contrary to Peraino’s 
assertion—exhibited by news organizations, most specifically national network and 
cable news outlets. What is essentially a discounting of embedded reporters already 
challenged clear-sightedness proved to be another way in which the individual 
embed’s coverage failed to provide a wide view of the war. 
                                                                                                                                           
reports had said that only tanks and tracked vehicles in the area had been destroyed, while Taniya 
residents told Burnett that 31 civilians had been killed in their beds by the bombing. 
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 It is difficult not to notice some of the glaring “misses” in coverage made by 
the American press in the months leading up to the start of the Iraq War, such as the 
fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency’s refuted a report that both 
President Bush and Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair cited, supposedly disclosing 
that the Hussein regime was six months away from developing a nuclear weapon, a 
story which got play in the United Kingdom press but produced one “buried” story in 
the United States.
230
  Or the 2000 report by the neoconservative group Project for a 
New American Century, picked up by some online sources and by the Scottish Daily 
Herald but largely ignored by the American mainstream press, declaring that one of 
the new administration’s goals was to “fight and decisively win multiple, 
simultaneous major theater wars” and “perform the ‘constabulary’ duties associated 
with shaping the security environment in critical regions (like the Middle East).”
231
   
Overt press patriotism is not a new phenomenon, however. Historian Geoffrey 
Stone says that after the enactment of the Alien and Sedition acts of 1798, newspaper 
writers held back from criticizing the administration of then-President John Adams 
for fear of being tried under the strict seditious libel law as the country hovered on the 
edge of a possible war with France. Those who were vehemently opposed to the 
Adams administration, the Federalist government that enacted the law, were often 
reduced to pamphleteering—and even then not safe from prison time and fines.
 232
 
Polarization in a protectivist society can be ascribed to the framework journalism 
                                                 
230
 Deepa Kumar. “Media, War, and Propaganda:  Strategies of Information Management During the 
2003 Iraq War.” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies. Vol. 3, no. 1. (Mar. 2006). p. 57. 
231
 “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century.”  Project for a 
New American Century, http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf.  
232
 Stone (2004). Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on 




critic Walter Lippmann said in 1922 that it is necessary to establish in wartime: the 
idea of an “us” and a “them” in order to allow the public to grasp the situations about 
which they must make vital life decisions.
233
  
With regard to the atmosphere in which the Iraq War was launched, Gina 
Barton and Beverly L. Campbell posit that the contagious jingoism after September 
11, 2001—which compelled some television reporters to wear flag pins or ribbons on 
their lapels—forced self-censorship in a climate of almost mandatory national 
solidarity.
234
  A preexisting air of national pride, in turn, makes the citizens—in 
whose number journalists are included—more susceptible to propaganda, argues 
media theorist Nancy Snow. “The warriors and those who profit from war try to 
persuade us that we’re one big happy family. It’s always ‘our’ national interest, 
national security, national defense, instead of ‘somebody’s’ security and interest.”
235
 
A country’s citizens are subject to a “scripting” of large-scale tragic events, 
set in motion by media reports, which cue participants as to what to say and what to 
expect, said author Thomas de Zengotita. De Zengotita mentioned not only 9/11, but 
the school shootings at Columbine High School and the Oklahoma City federal 
building bombing. Because of media saturation, we feel as though we are present at 
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 One of the greatest mistakes made by critics of media response to 9/11 is the 
automatic presumption that due to the nature of their job that journalists are should be 
unaffected by the happenings they cover. Were a veteran news anchor like Dan 
Rather unaffected by the events of September 11, 2001, he likely would not have 
declared, “George Bush is the President, he makes the decisions and, you know, as 
just one American, he wants me to line up, just tell me where.” Rather also said that 
journalists were afraid of being too critical of the government post-9/11.
237
 His 
assertion was borne out by at least two instances in which journalists were rebuked by 
their respective news organizations for voicing dissent. MSNBC reporter Ashleigh 
Banfield said at a 2003 lecture at Kansas State University that America tends to 
disregard the First Amendment when it becomes “unpalatable.” Parent company NBC 
released a public statement saying “Ms. Banfield does not speak for NBC News.”
238
  
CNN’s Christiane Amanpour was similarly taken to task for saying the press “was 
muzzled and…self-muzzled” after 9/11. CNN Newsgroup president Jim Walton said 
“her comments do not reflect the reality of our coverage.”
239
 
The climate of unquestioning support combined with fear of reprisal for 
criticism helped to create the timid, pro-American news organizations that embedded 
their reporters with U.S. troops at the start of the Iraq War in 2003, said Rutgers 
University Professor Deepa Kumar. “With titles and logos that in no uncertain terms 
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establish “us” and “them” in news coverage, it was almost a foregone conclusion 





Embedded television reporters seemed to delight in presiding over the confusion and 
chaos of bombings and gun battles on-screen, narrating every ear-shattering mortar 
explosion with the dedicated ferocity of a weather reporter standing in a hurricane.
241
 
Terence Smith captures this breathless feeling with an account of CNN’s Martin 
Savidge reporting on a foray into Baghdad on Apr. 9, 2003. The picture, as Smith 
describes it, is grainy but distinguishable—showing blossoms of light silhouetting 
Savidge. He describes the sounds in the vignette, tries to inform viewers of what the 




A number of broadcast embeds testified that they did not have control over 
their reports once they had finished shooting. “Everyone at home saw more of the war 
than I did,” Rick Levanthal of Fox News said. “[W]hen people talk about different 
networks and how they did and all that, I can’t really talk about that, and I can’t 
compare the tone of the coverage because I honestly didn’t see it.”
243
 Describing an 
incident in which he happened upon a barber shop in a village near Najaf with a 
picture of the New York skyline—including the World Trade Center towers—in its 
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window, CBS Evening News correspondent Jim Axelrod said he took footage of both 
the barbershop window and several mutilated bodies nearby, but he does not know 
what was cut and what was left in. “I still haven’t seen a lick of video; I haven’t seen 
a frame of what we produced.”
244
 
 Editorial decisions with regard to footage once it left embeds’ hands became a 
major argument used by media scholars to argue that coverage of the war had been 
“sanitized” for an American audience that was both squeamish and unwilling to look 
at the human costs of war. Both broadcast and print embeds faced decisions by 
editors not to run photographs or footage of gruesome images, but the effect is more 
pronounced when examining the purely visual medium of television. According to 
Aday, Livingston, and Hebert, none of the U.S. channels observed in their studies 
paid much attention to U.S. or British casualties, Iraqi casualties, or civilian 
casualties, and coverage of these topics was conspicuously absent on the Fox News 
Channel evening shows and on CNN’s Lou Dobbs Show, an analysis program.  
 CNN correspondent Martin Savidge describes an episode in which several 
Iraqi fighters in an industrial complex were gunned down by American forces after 
they refused to stop advancing. Savidge and his camera operator, Scott McWhinnie, 
filmed part of the aftermath of this episode, some of which was graphic and bloody in 
nature. They warned CNN of some of the content when transmitting the story. “I’ve 
heard talk that it will air someday, but it has not yet.” He also mentioned the killing of 
two American civilian contractors in Kuwait. The Kuwait Press ran a photograph of 
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one of the dead men on the front page, while U.S. news sources ran “sanitized” 
pictures of a bullet-riddled truck.
245
 
 CBS White House correspondent John Roberts agreed. “I couldn’t walk up to 
a bus that had been hit by 25-mm cannon fire and see all the dead Iraqis lying around, 
blown up into bits and pieces, headless bodies or whatever—I can report on that—but 
I certainly can’t show those pictures on television. You have to sanitize your coverage 
somewhat for American sensibilities, but really it’s just the pictures that were 
sanitized. It certainly wasn’t the words.”
246
 
 That wasn’t the experience of National Public Radio reporter Eric Westervelt. 
A listener had written in to the Washington-based network complaining that the 
sounds of tanks and guns in the background had been “sensationalist.” Westervelt 
fired back angrily, saying it was realistic, and it wasn’t a gruesome picture of a 
mutilated corpse or injured child. “Sensationalist?” he said. “What would they like 
instead? A story about war with people drinking tea?”
247
  
There is significant evidence that network presentation proved detrimental to 
what the Aday, Livingston, and Hebert claim was largely balanced coverage by 
embeds in the field.
248
 The 2005 study further supports my assertion that the 
narrowness of embedded-reporter coverage was amplified by overt jingoism on the 
part of the news organization. Across stories by 205 unembedded, domestically-based 
“beat” reporters and 398 news anchors, 11.1 percent of reports by domestic 
journalists adopted a tone supportive of the U.S. effort in Iraq.  11.9 percent of stories 
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by network anchors had a pro-American tone during the sample period from March 
20 to April 20, 2003.
249
 Of the guests invited by networks to give opinions, or chosen 
as interview subjects, retired military officials spoke positively of the war in 34 
percent of stories, while U.S. political officials did so in 11.6 percent. Those who 
spoke positively least often about the war effort were current U.S. military officials 
(with 6.6 percent) and soldiers on the ground. Embedded reporters and soldiers 
interviewed in the field adopted a positive or supportive tone toward the war effort in 
the same percentage of stories (9 percent). 
250
 
 One particular channel, Fox News, made no bones about its pro-American 
stance. Fox News president Roger Ailes said on the air that there was nothing wrong 
with supporting the U.S. troops and U.S. effort in Iraq.
251
 Fox contributed 
significantly to the pro-war slant on coverage, hosting the preponderance of the 
stories in which news anchors interviewed retired military officials. And 60 percent 
of stories in which an anchor (rather than an embedded reporter or a beat reporter) led 




 The jingoistic tone of coverage and decisions by the Fox News higher-ups 
caused viewership of the cable news channel to soar to 3 million after Sept. 11 and 
into the first three months of the invasion, The New York Times reported. In order to 
make up for lagging viewership, Jim Rutenberg claimed in the Times, MSNBC and—
to an extent—CNN tried to capture more of the politically conservative viewing 
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audience that had facilitated Fox’s meteoric ratings rise. Both networks succeeded 
somewhat in claiming a larger slice of the conservative audience than they had had 
before, with CNN and MSNBC viewership rising to 2.65 million and 1.4 million 
average daily viewers, respectively.
253
  
Another factor contributing to ratings growth, especially in cable news, was 
the intense, theatrical live coverage of “Shock and Awe”—the aerial bombardment of 
Baghdad—and skirmishes between armed forces units and Iraqi soldiers on the road 
to the capital.
254
 A Los Angeles Times poll in Apr. 2003 showed that around 70 
percent of Americans were getting most of their news about the war from cable 
networks such as MSNBC, Fox News Channel, and CNN.
255
  Mark Effron, 
MSNBC’s vice president for live news programming, opined that this was because 
print news sources such as newspapers were “obsolete” by the time they reached the 
reader’s doorstep, whereas live 24-hour cable television coverage had its finger on the 
pulse of the war constantly. Not only did it show “vivid” reports from television 
embeds in the field, but tempered them with central command and Pentagon briefings 
and interspersed them with the musings and insights of hired consultants and guests 
such as retired, high-ranking military personnel.
256
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Jack Shafer argued that TV news inflated embeds’ footage of intermittent 
small-arms fire into tense shootouts, and minor skirmishes became full-bore battles 
on the screen.
257
 Detroit News reporter John Bebow reflected on what he also 
perceived as TV news outlets’ tendency to overhype combat situations. “If you’re 
watching the fear channels, it’s easy imagining that the war zone must be this hellish 
place filled with an unbelievable amount of gunfire … it’s just not like that. It was 
definitely zany, but it wasn’t every-minute dangerous.”
258
 In the instance of intense 
viewership, according to the director of the Program on International Policy 
Attitudes, it is even more heavily incumbent on news programs to correct for existent 
bias and provide balanced coverage wherever possible. “If there are misperceptions 
emerging, if there are biases … if the goal is to end up with an informed citizenry or 
electorate, then one has to compensate for these tendencies.”
259
   
 Perhaps the 2003 Iraq War and the consequent fallout with regard to objective 
coverage will prove a lesson to U.S. media outlets, suggests David Elstein, a BBC 
Veteran who helped found BBC Channel Five in 1997 and has worked for the British-
based satellite television network Sky. Elstein writes for OpenDemocracy.net that the 
BBC has grown even stricter in its insistence upon objectivity since the Thatcher 
government called the network out for its lack of visible nationalistic support during 
the 1982 Falklands War. For their insistence upon casting a cold eye on coalition 
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Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
 
As with many conflicts since Grenada, lack of access appears to have been the 
presiding factor depriving embedded reporters of the possibility of balanced, wide-
scope coverage at the beginning of the 2003 Iraq War. Beholden to some sort of 
military intervention, news organizations had little control over how reporters would 
be deployed in overseas conflict situations following the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. 
Moving with military units, embeds could not control how quickly or slowly they 
moved, where they stopped, and with whom they could conduct interviews. 
Embedded reporters depended on military officials for access both to military 
operations and to the troops themselves—access which was spotty at best, and 
dependent on the temperament of the presiding officer. Certain reporters were 
shunned or even disembedded for producing coverage that was unsavory to the 
military or to the government. 
 Reporters who embedded with troops were limited by operational protocols as 
to when and where they could film, photograph, or transmit stories. Embeds 
depended upon the military for safety, provisions, and comradeship, an arrangement 
some said was not conducive to the maintenance of a level head or a clear eye. 
Additionally, embedded reporters were limited by their own patriotic affiliations, and 
even more so by the suppressive actions of news organizations unwilling to challenge 
nationalistic sentiment, or vying for ratings. All of these factors whittled away at the 
capacity of the individual embedded reporter to produce a contextualized, 




capacity for broad-scope coverage by any group of reporters—embedded or not—was 
limited in the second Iraq War. With embeds, the Defense Department created a class 
of sanctioned reporters. This came in stark contrast to the free-ranging unilaterals, 
who were sometimes denied contact with soldiers on the ground and, at worst, denied 
protection from military forces in the midst of hostilities. As a result, unilaterals lost 
out on the intimate access to U.S. forces that was the purview of the embeds.  
 Abetted by parent organizations ranging from uncritical to jingoistic—though 
some critics argue that aggregate coverage captured the essence of U.S. efforts in the 
war—embedded reporters’ own coverage was limited. It remains to be seen, if the 
embedding program is continued in future U.S. conflicts abroad, whether coverage 
will lag despite individual good intentions, professionalism, objectivity, and 
technological advances. All that can follow is press negotiations with the government 
toward a better and more satisfactory system. Whether or not embedding is the best 
system to date since Vietnam—and the best in the twenty-first century—is irrelevant; 
the system will no doubt bear a re-evaluation from both the news media and the 
military in the case that the U.S. goes to war against a foreign nation in the future. 
Perhaps this will mean a revision of the “Statement of Principles” to reflect the 
strengths and shortcomings of the embedding program. Most journalists on whose 
accounts of the program this paper is based were in agreement that truly 
comprehensive foreign war coverage requires reporting from all angles: inside the 
military units, from the perspective of national governments, and among the citizens 




media relations may entail an acceptance by journalists that no one perspective—






Appendix I: Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media During Possible 
Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Commands Area of 
Responsibility (AOR). 
 
101900Z FEB 03 
FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-PA// 
TO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//CHAIRS// 
AIG 8777 
HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//PA// 
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JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//PA// 
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//PA// 
CJCS WASHINGTON DC//PA// 
NSC WASHINGTON DC 
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 
INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-PA/DPO// 
UNCLAS 
 
SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) ON EMBEDDING MEDIA 
DURING POSSIBLE FUTURE OPERATIONS/DEPLOYMENTS IN THE U.S. 
CENTRAL COMMANDS (CENTCOM) AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR). 
REFERENCES: REF. A. SECDEF MSG, DTG 172200Z JAN 03, SUBJ: 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) FOR MOVEMENT OF FORCES INTO 
THE 
CENTCOM AOR FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE OPERATIONS. 
 
1. PURPOSE. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES GUIDANCE, POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES ON EMBEDDING NEWS MEDIA DURING POSSIBLE FUTURE 
OPERATIONS/DEPLOYMENTS IN THE CENTCOM AOR. IT CAN BE 
ADAPTED 
FOR USE IN OTHER UNIFIED COMMAND AORS AS NECESSARY. 
 
2. POLICY. 
2.A. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) POLICY ON MEDIA 
COVERAGE 
OF FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS IS THAT MEDIA WILL HAVE LONG-
TERM, MINIMALLY RESTRICTIVE ACCESS TO U.S. AIR, GROUND AND 
NAVAL FORCES THROUGH EMBEDDING. MEDIA COVERAGE OF ANY 
FUTURE OPERATION WILL, TO A LARGE EXTENT, SHAPE PUBLIC 
PERCEPTION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT NOW AND IN 
THE YEARS AHEAD. THIS HOLDS TRUE FOR THE U.S. PUBLIC; THE 




DURABILITY OF OUR COALITION; AND PUBLICS IN COUNTRIES WHERE 
WE CONDUCT OPERATIONS, WHOSE PERCEPTIONS OF US CAN AFFECT 
THE COST AND DURATION OF OUR INVOLVEMENT. OUR ULTIMATE 
STRATEGIC SUCCESS IN BRINGING PEACE AND SECURITY TO THIS 
REGION WILL COME IN OUR LONG-TERM COMMITMENT TO 
SUPPORTING OUR DEMOCRATIC IDEALS. WE NEED TO TELL THE 
FACTUAL STORY - GOOD OR BAD - BEFORE OTHERS SEED THE MEDIA 
WITH DISINFORMATION AND DISTORTIONS, AS THEY MOST CERTAINLY 
WILL CONTINUE TO DO. OUR PEOPLE IN THE FIELD NEED TO TELL OUR 
STORY – ONLY COMMANDERS CAN ENSURE THE MEDIA GET TO THE 
STORY ALONGSIDE THE TROOPS. WE MUST ORGANIZE FOR AND 
FACILITATE ACCESS OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA TO 
OUR FORCES, INCLUDING THOSE FORCES ENGAGED IN GROUND 
OPERATIONS, WITH THE GOAL OF DOING SO RIGHT FROM THE START. 
TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, WE WILL EMBED MEDIA WITH OUR UNITS. 
THESE EMBEDDED MEDIA WILL LIVE, WORK AND TRAVEL AS PART OF 
THE UNITS WITH WHICH THEY ARE EMBEDDED TO FACILITATE 
MAXIMUM, IN-DEPTH COVERAGE OF U.S. FORCES IN COMBAT AND 
RELATED OPERATIONS. COMMANDERS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS 
MUST WORK TOGETHER TO BALANCE THE NEED FOR MEDIA ACCESS 
WITH THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY. 
 
2.B. MEDIA WILL BE EMBEDDED WITH UNIT PERSONNEL AT AIR AND 
GROUND FORCES BASES AND AFLOAT TO ENSURE A FULL 
UNDERSTANDING OF ALL OPERATIONS. MEDIA WILL BE GIVEN ACCESS 
TO OPERATIONAL COMBAT MISSIONS, INCLUDING MISSION 
PREPARATION AND DEBRIEFING, WHENEVER POSSIBLE. 
 
2.C. A MEDIA EMBED IS DEFINED AS A MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE 
REMAINING WITH A UNIT ON AN EXTENDED BASIS - PERHAPS A PERIOD 
OF 
WEEKS OR EVEN MONTHS. COMMANDERS WILL PROVIDE BILLETING, 
RATIONS AND MEDICAL ATTENTION, IF NEEDED, TO THE EMBEDDED 
MEDIA COMMENSURATE WITH THAT PROVIDED TO MEMBERS OF THE 
UNIT, AS WELL AS ACCESS TO MILITARY TRANSPORTATION AND 
ASSISTANCE WITH COMMUNICATIONS FILING/TRANSMITTING MEDIA 
PRODUCTS, IF REQUIRED. 
 
2.C.1. EMBEDDED MEDIA ARE NOT AUTHORIZED USE OF THEIR OWN 
VEHICLES WHILE TRAVELING IN AN EMBEDDED STATUS. 
 
2.C.2. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, SPACE ON MILITARY 
TRANSPORTATION 
WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR MEDIA EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO 
COVER A PARTICULAR OPERATION. THE MEDIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR 




OF PRIORITY INTER-THEATER AIRLIFT FOR EMBEDDED MEDIA TO 
COVER STORIES, AS WELL AS TO FILE STORIES, IS HIGHLY 
ENCOURAGED. SEATS ABOARD VEHICLES, AIRCRAFT AND NAVAL 
SHIPS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ALLOW MAXIMUM COVERAGE OF 
U.S. TROOPS IN THE FIELD. 
 
2.C.3. UNITS SHOULD PLAN LIFT AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO ASSIST 
IN MOVING MEDIA PRODUCTS TO AND FROM THE BATTLEFIELD SO AS 
TO 
TELL OUR STORY IN A TIMELY MANNER. IN THE EVENT OF 
COMMERCIAL 
COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTIES, MEDIA ARE AUTHORIZED TO FILE 
STORIES VIA EXPEDITIOUS MILITARY SIGNAL/COMMUNICATIONS 
CAPABILITIES. 
 
2.C.4. NO COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT FOR USE BY MEDIA IN THE 
CONDUCT OF THEIR DUTIES WILL BE SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITED. 
HOWEVER, UNIT COMMANDERS MAY IMPOSE TEMPORARY 
RESTRICTIONS ON ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSIONS FOR OPERATIONAL 
SECURITY REASONS. 
MEDIA WILL SEEK APPROVAL TO USE ELECTRONIC DEVICES IN A 
COMBAT/HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY 
THE 
UNIT COMMANDER OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE. THE 
USE OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT WILL BE DISCUSSED IN FULL 




3.A. THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OASD(PA) IS THE CENTRAL AGENCY FOR MANAGING 
AND VETTING MEDIA EMBEDS TO INCLUDE ALLOCATING EMBED 
SLOTS TO MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS. EMBED AUTHORITY MAY BE 
DELEGATED TO SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS AFTER THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES AND AT THE DISCRETION OF 
OASD(PA). EMBED OPPORTUNITIES WILL BE ASSIGNED TO MEDIA 
ORGANIZATIONS, NOT TO INDIVIDUAL REPORTERS. THE DECISION AS 
TO WHICH MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE WILL FILL ASSIGNED EMBED 
SLOTS WILL BE MADE BY THE DESIGNATED POC FOR EACH NEWS 
ORGANIZATION. 
 
3.A.1. IAW REF. A, COMMANDERS OF UNITS IN RECEIPT OF A 
DEPLOYMENT ORDER MAY EMBED REGIONAL/LOCAL MEDIA DURING 
PREPARATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT, DEPLOYMENT AND ARRIVAL IN 
THEATER UPON RECEIPT OF THEATER CLEARANCE FROM CENTCOM 




INFORM THESE MEDIA, PRIOR TO THE DEPLOYING EMBED, THAT 
OASD(PA) IS THE APPROVAL AUTHORITY FOR ALL COMBAT EMBEDS 
AND THAT THEIR PARTICULAR EMBED MAY END AFTER THE UNIT'S 
ARRIVAL IN THEATER. THE MEDIA ORGANIZATION MAY APPLY TO 
OASD(PA) FOR CONTINUED EMBEDDING, BUT THERE IS NO GUARANTEE 
AND THE MEDIA ORGANIZATION WILL HAVE TO MAKE 
ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND PAY FOR THE JOURNALISTS' RETURN TRIP. 
 
3.B. WITHOUT MAKING COMMITMENTS TO MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS, 
DEPLOYING UNITS WILL IDENTIFY LOCAL MEDIA FOR POTENTIAL 
EMBEDS 
AND NOMINATE THEM THROUGH PA CHANNELS TO OASD(PA) (POC: 
MAJ TIM BLAIR, DSN 227-1253; COMM. 703-697-1253; EMAIL 
TIMOTHY.BLAIR@OSD.MIL). INFORMATION REQUIRED TO BE 
FORWARDED 
INCLUDES MEDIA ORGANIZATION, TYPE OF MEDIA AND CONTACT 
INFORMATION INCLUDING BUREAU CHIEF/MANAGING EDITOR/NEWS 
DIRECTOR'S NAME; OFFICE, HOME AND CELL PHONE NUMBERS; PAGER 
NUMBERS AND EMAIL ADDRESSES. SUBMISSIONS FOR EMBEDS WITH 
SPECIFIC UNITS SHOULD INCLUDE AN UNIT'S RECOMMENDATION AS TO 
WHETHER THE REQUEST SHOULD BE HONORED. 
 
3.C. UNIT COMMANDERS SHOULD ALSO EXPRESS, THROUGH THEIR 
CHAIN 
OF COMMAND AND PA CHANNELS TO OASD(PA), THEIR DESIRE AND 
CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT ADDITIONAL MEDIA EMBEDS BEYOND THOSE 
ASSIGNED. 
 
3.D. FREELANCE MEDIA WILL BE AUTHORIZED TO EMBED IF THEY ARE 
SELECTED BY A NEWS ORGANIZATION AS THEIR EMBED 
REPRESENTATIVE. 
 
3.E. UNITS WILL BE AUTHORIZED DIRECT COORDINATION WITH MEDIA 
AFTER ASSIGNMENT AND APPROVAL BY OASD(PA). 
 
3.E.1.UNITS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT ALL EMBEDDED 
MEDIA AND THEIR NEWS ORGANIZATIONS HAVE SIGNED THE 
"RELEASE, 
INDEMNIFICATION, AND HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT AND 
AGREEMENT NOT TO SUE", FOUND AT 
HTTP://WWW.DEFENSELINK.MIL/NEWS/FEB2003/D20030210EMBED.PDF. 
UNITS MUST MAINTAIN A COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT FOR ALL MEDIA 
EMBEDDED WITH THEIR UNIT. 
 




ESCORT MAY BE ASSIGNED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE UNIT 
COMMANDER. THE ABSENCE OF A PA ESCORT IS NOT A REASON TO 
PRECLUDE MEDIA ACCESS TO OPERATIONS. 
 
3.G. COMMANDERS WILL ENSURE THE MEDIA ARE PROVIDED WITH 
EVERY 
OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE ACTUAL COMBAT OPERATIONS. THE 
PERSONAL SAFETY OF CORRESPONDENTS IS NOT A REASON TO 
EXCLUDE THEM FROM COMBAT AREAS. 
 
3.H. IF, IN THE OPINION OF THE UNIT COMMANDER, A MEDIA 
REPRESENTATIVE IS UNABLE TO WITHSTAND THE RIGOROUS 
CONDITIONS 
REQUIRED TO OPERATE WITH THE FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES, THE 
COMMANDER OR HIS/HER REPRESENTATIVE MAY LIMIT THE 
REPRESENTATIVES PARTICIPATION WITH OPERATIONAL FORCES TO 
ENSURE UNIT SAFETY AND INFORM OASD(PA) THROUGH PA CHANNELS 
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. GENDER WILL NOT BE AN EXCLUDING FACTOR 
UNDER ANYCIRCUMSTANCE. 
 
3.I. IF FOR ANY REASON A MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE CANNOT 
PARTICIPATE IN AN OPERATION, THEY WILL BE TRANSPORTED TO THE 
NEXT HIGHER HEADQUARTERS FOR THE DURATION OF THE 
OPERATION. 
 
3.J. COMMANDERS WILL OBTAIN THEATER CLEARANCE FROM 
CENTCOM/PA FOR MEDIA EMBARKING ON MILITARY CONVEYANCE 
FOR PURPOSES OF EMBEDDING. 
 
3.K. UNITS HOSTING EMBEDDED MEDIA WILL ISSUE INVITATIONAL 
TRAVEL ORDERS, AND NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL (NBC) 
GEAR. SEE PARA. 5. FOR DETAILS ON WHICH ITEMS ARE ISSUED AND 
WHICH ITEMS THE MEDIA ARE RESPONSIBLE TO PROVIDE FOR 
THEMSELVES. 
 
3.L. MEDIA ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OBTAINING THEIR OWN PASSPORTS 
AND VISAS. 
 
3.M. MEDIA WILL AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE CENTCOM/OASD(PA) 
GROUND 
RULES STATED IN PARA. 4 OF THIS MESSAGE IN EXCHANGE FOR 
COMMAND/UNIT-PROVIDED SUPPORT AND ACCESS TO SERVICE 
MEMBERS, 
INFORMATION AND OTHER PREVIOUSLY-STATED PRIVILEGES. ANY 





THAT MEDIA'S EMBED OPPORTUNITY. 
 
3.N. DISPUTES/DIFFICULTIES. ISSUES, QUESTIONS, DIFFICULTIES OR 
DISPUTES ASSOCIATED WITH GROUND RULES OR OTHER ASPECTS OF 
EMBEDDING MEDIA THAT CANNOT BE RESOLVED AT THE UNIT LEVEL, 
OR 
THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, WILL BE FORWARDED THROUGH 
PA 
CHANNELS FOR RESOLUTION. COMMANDERS WHO WISH TO 
TERMINATE AN EMBED FOR CAUSE MUST NOTIFY CENTCOM/PA PRIOR 
TO TERMINATION. IF A DISPUTE CANNOT BE RESOLVED AT A LOWER 
LEVEL, OASD(PA) WILL BE THE FINAL RESOLUTION AUTHORITY. IN ALL 
CASES, THIS SHOULD BE DONE AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE TO 
PRESERVE THE NEWS VALUE OF THE SITUATION. 
 
3.O. MEDIA WILL PAY THEIR OWN BILLETING EXPENSES IF BILLETED IN 
A COMMERCIAL FACILITY. 
 
3.P. MEDIA WILL DEPLOY WITH THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT TO 
COLLECT 
AND TRANSMIT THEIR STORIES. 
 
3.Q. THE STANDARD FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION SHOULD BE TO 
ASK 
"WHY NOT RELEASE" VICE "WHY RELEASE." DECISIONS SHOULD BE 
MADE 
ASAP, PREFERABLY IN MINUTES, NOT HOURS. 
 
3.R. THERE IS NO GENERAL REVIEW PROCESS FOR MEDIA PRODUCTS. 
SEE PARA 6.A. FOR FURTHER DETAIL CONCERNING SECURITY AT THE 
SOURCE. 
3.S. MEDIA WILL ONLY BE GRANTED ACCESS TO DETAINEES OR EPWS 
WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949. SEE 
PARA. 4.G.17. FOR THE GROUND RULE. 
 
3.T. HAVING EMBEDDED MEDIA DOES NOT PRECLUDE CONTACT WITH 
OTHER MEDIA. EMBEDDED MEDIA, AS A RESULT OF TIME INVESTED 
WITH THE UNIT AND GROUND RULES AGREEMENT, MAY HAVE A 
DIFFERENT LEVEL OF ACCESS. 
 
3.U. CENTCOM/PA WILL ACCOUNT FOR EMBEDDED MEDIA DURING THE 
TIME THE MEDIA IS EMBEDDED IN THEATER. CENTCOM/PA WILL 
REPORT 
CHANGES IN EMBED STATUS TO OASD(PA) AS THEY OCCUR. 
 




COURSE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE UNIT WILL IMMEDIATELY 
NOTIFY OASD(PA), THROUGH PA CHANNELS. OASD(PA) WILL CONTACT 
THE RESPECTIVE MEDIA ORGANIZATION(S), WHICH WILL MAKE NEXT 
OF KIN NOTIFICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INDIVIDUAL'S 
WISHES. 
 
3.W. MEDIA MAY TERMINATE THEIR EMBED OPPORTUNITY AT ANY 
TIME. 
UNIT COMMANDERS WILL PROVIDE, AS THE TACTICAL SITUATION 
PERMITS AND BASED ON THE AVAILABILITY OF TRANSPORTATION, 
MOVEMENT BACK TO THE NEAREST LOCATION WITH COMMERCIAL 
TRANSPORTATION. 
 
3.W.1. DEPARTING MEDIA WILL BE DEBRIEFED ON OPERATIONAL 
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AS APPLICABLE TO ONGOING AND 
FUTURE 
OPERATIONS WHICH THEY MAY NOW HAVE INFORMATION 
CONCERNING. 
 
4. GROUND RULES. FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF U.S. FORCES 
AND EMBEDDED MEDIA, MEDIA WILL ADHERE TO ESTABLISHED 
GROUND 
RULES. GROUND RULES WILL BE AGREED TO IN ADVANCE AND SIGNED 
BY 
MEDIA PRIOR TO EMBEDDING. VIOLATION OF THE GROUND RULES 
MAY 
RESULT IN THE IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF THE EMBED AND 
REMOVAL 
FROM THE AOR. THESE GROUND RULES RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF THE 
MEDIA TO COVER MILITARY OPERATIONS AND ARE IN NO WAY 
INTENDED TO PREVENT RELEASE OF DEROGATORY, EMBARRASSING, 
NEGATIVE OR 
UNCOMPLIMENTARY INFORMATION. ANY MODIFICATION TO THE 
STANDARD GROUND RULES WILL BE FORWARDED THROUGH THE PA 
CHANNELS TO CENTCOM/PA FOR APPROVAL. STANDARD GROUND 
RULES ARE: 
 
4.A. ALL INTERVIEWS WITH SERVICE MEMBERS WILL BE ON THE 
RECORD. 
SECURITY AT THE SOURCE IS THE POLICY. INTERVIEWS WITH PILOTS 
AND AIRCREW MEMBERS ARE AUTHORIZED UPON COMPLETION OF 
MISSIONS; HOWEVER, RELEASE OF INFORMATION MUST CONFORM TO 
THESE MEDIA GROUND RULES. 
 





LOCAL GROUND RULES. LOCAL GROUND RULES WILL BE 
COORDINATED 
THROUGH COMMAND CHANNELS WITH CENTCOM. 
 




4.D. LIGHT DISCIPLINE RESTRICTIONS WILL BE FOLLOWED. VISIBLE 
LIGHT SOURCES, INCLUDING FLASH OR TELEVISION LIGHTS, FLASH 
CAMERAS WILL NOT BE USED WHEN OPERATING WITH FORCES AT 
NIGHT 
UNLESS SPECIFICALLY APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY THE ON-SCENE 
COMMANDER. 
 
4.E. EMBARGOES MAY BE IMPOSED TO PROTECT OPERATIONAL 
SECURITY. 
EMBARGOES WILL ONLY BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY AND 
WILL BE LIFTED AS SOON AS THE OPERATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE HAS 
PASSED. 
 
4.F. THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION ARE RELEASABLE. 
 
4.F.1. APPROXIMATE FRIENDLY FORCE STRENGTH FIGURES. 
 
4.F.2. APPROXIMATE FRIENDLY CASUALTY FIGURES BY SERVICE. 
EMBEDDED MEDIA MAY, WITHIN OPSEC LIMITS, CONFIRM UNIT 
CASUALTIES THEY HAVE WITNESSED. 
 
4.F.3. CONFIRMED FIGURES OF ENEMY PERSONNEL DETAINED OR 
CAPTURED. 
 
4.F.4. SIZE OF FRIENDLY FORCE PARTICIPATING IN AN ACTION OR 
OPERATION CAN BE DISCLOSED USING APPROXIMATE TERMS. SPECIFIC 
FORCE OR UNIT IDENTIFICATION MAY BE RELEASED WHEN IT NO 
LONGER 
WARRANTS SECURITY PROTECTION. 
 
4.F.5. INFORMATION AND LOCATION OF MILITARY TARGETS AND 
OBJECTIVES PREVIOUSLY UNDER ATTACK. 
 
4.F.6. GENERIC DESCRIPTION OF ORIGIN OF AIR OPERATIONS, SUCH AS 
"LAND-BASED." 
 





MISSIONS AND ACTIONS, AS WELL AS MISSION RESULTS ARE 
RELEASABLE 
ONLY IF DESCRIBED IN GENERAL TERMS. 
 
4.F.8. TYPES OF ORDNANCE EXPENDED IN GENERAL TERMS. 
 
4.F.9. NUMBER OF AERIAL COMBAT OR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OR 
SORTIES FLOWN IN CENTCOM'S AREA OF OPERATION. 
 
4.F.10. TYPE OF FORCES INVOLVED (E.G., AIR DEFENSE, INFANTRY, 
ARMOR, MARINES). 
 
4.F.11. ALLIED PARTICIPATION BY TYPE OF OPERATION (SHIPS, 




4.F.12. OPERATION CODE NAMES. 
 
4.F.13. NAMES AND HOMETOWNS OF U.S. MILITARY UNITS. 
 
4.F.14. SERVICE MEMBERS' NAMES AND HOME TOWNS WITH THE 
INDIVIDUALS' CONSENT. 
 
4.G. THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION ARE NOT 
RELEASABLE SINCE THEIR PUBLICATION OR BROADCAST COULD 
JEOPARDIZE OPERATIONS AND ENDANGER LIVES. 
 
4.G.1. SPECIFIC NUMBER OF TROOPS IN UNITS BELOW CORPS/MEF 
LEVEL. 
 
4.G.2. SPECIFIC NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT IN UNITS AT OR BELOW THE AIR 
EXPEDITIONARY WING LEVEL. 
 
4.G.3. SPECIFIC NUMBERS REGARDING OTHER EQUIPMENT OR CRITICAL 
SUPPLIES (E.G. ARTILLERY, TANKS, LANDING CRAFT, RADARS, TRUCKS, 
WATER, ETC.). 
 
4.G.4. SPECIFIC NUMBERS OF SHIPS IN UNITS BELOW THE CARRIER 
BATTLE GROUP LEVEL. 
 
4.G.5. NAMES OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OR SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHIC 
LOCATIONS OF MILITARY UNITS IN THE CENTCOM AREA OF 





OF DEFENSE OR AUTHORIZED BY THE CENTCOM COMMANDER. NEWS 
AND 
IMAGERY PRODUCTS THAT IDENTIFY OR INCLUDE IDENTIFIABLE 
FEATURES OF THESE LOCATIONS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE. 
 
4.G.6. INFORMATION REGARDING FUTURE OPERATIONS. 
 
4.G.7. INFORMATION REGARDING FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES AT 
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OR ENCAMPMENTS (EXCEPT THOSE WHICH 
ARE VISIBLE OR READILY APPARENT). 
 
4.G.8. PHOTOGRAPHY SHOWING LEVEL OF SECURITY AT MILITARY 
INSTALLATIONS OR ENCAMPMENTS. 
 
4.G.9. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. 
 
4.G.10. INFORMATION ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES 
COMPROMISING TACTICS, TECHNIQUES OR PROCEDURES. 
 
4.G.11. EXTRA PRECAUTIONS IN REPORTING WILL BE REQUIRED AT THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES TO MAXIMIZE OPERATIONAL 
SURPRISE. 
LIVE BROADCASTS FROM AIRFIELDS, ON THE GROUND OR AFLOAT, BY 
EMBEDDED MEDIA ARE PROHIBITED UNTIL THE SAFE RETURN OF THE 
INITIAL STRIKE PACKAGE OR UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY THE UNIT 
COMMANDER. 
 
4.G.12. DURING AN OPERATION, SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON FRIENDLY 
FORCE TROOP MOVEMENTS, TACTICAL DEPLOYMENTS, AND 
DISPOSITIONS THAT WOULD JEOPARDIZE OPERATIONAL SECURITY OR 
LIVES. INFORMATION ON ON-GOING ENGAGEMENTS WILL NOT BE 
RELEASED UNLESS AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE BY ON-SCENE 
COMMANDER. 
 
4.G.13. INFORMATION ON SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNITS, UNIQUE 
OPERATIONS METHODOLOGY OR TACTICS, FOR EXAMPLE, AIR 
OPERATIONS, ANGLES OF ATTACK, AND SPEEDS; NAVAL TACTICAL OR 
EVASIVE MANEUVERS, ETC. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "LOW" OR 
"FAST" MAY BE USED. 
 
4.G.14. INFORMATION ON EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY ELECTRONIC 
WARFARE. 
 






4.G.16. INFORMATION ON MISSING OR DOWNED AIRCRAFT OR MISSING 
VESSELS WHILE SEARCH AND RESCUE AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS 
ARE 
BEING PLANNED OR UNDERWAY. 
 
4.G.17. INFORMATION ON EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY CAMOUFLAGE, 
COVER, DECEPTION, TARGETING, DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE, 
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, OR SECURITY MEASURES. 
 
4.G.18. NO PHOTOGRAPHS OR OTHER VISUAL MEDIA SHOWING AN 
ENEMY 
PRISONER OF WAR OR DETAINEE'S RECOGNIZABLE FACE, NAMETAG OR 
OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURE OR ITEM MAY BE TAKEN. 
 
4.G.19. STILL OR VIDEO IMAGERY OF CUSTODY OPERATIONS OR 
INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONS UNDER CUSTODY. 
 
4.H. THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES AND POLICIES APPLY TO 
COVERAGE OF WOUNDED, INJURED, AND ILL PERSONNEL: 
 
4.H.1. MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE REMINDED OF THE 
SENSITIVITY OF USING NAMES OF INDIVIDUAL CASUALTIES OR 
PHOTOGRAPHS THEY MAY HAVE TAKEN WHICH CLEARLY IDENTIFY 




4.H.2. BATTLEFIELD CASUALTIES MAY BE COVERED BY EMBEDDED 
MEDIA 
AS LONG AS THE SERVICE MEMBER'S IDENTITY IS PROTECTED FROM 
DISCLOSURE FOR 72 HOURS OR UPON VERIFICATION OF NOK 
NOTIFICATION, WHICHEVER IS FIRST. 
 
4.H.3. MEDIA VISITS TO MEDICAL FACILITIES WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH APPLICABLE REGULATIONS, STANDARD OPERATING 
PROCEDURES, 
OPERATIONS ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS BY ATTENDING PHYSICIANS. 
IF 
APPROVED, SERVICE OR MEDICAL FACILITY PERSONNEL MUST ESCORT 
MEDIA AT ALL TIMES. 
 
4.H.4. PATIENT WELFARE, PATIENT PRIVACY, AND NEXT OF KIN/FAMILY 
CONSIDERATIONS ARE THE GOVERNING CONCERNS ABOUT NEWS 
MEDIA 




TREATMENT FACILITIES OR OTHER CASUALTY COLLECTION AND 
TREATMENT LOCATIONS. 
 
4.H.5. MEDIA VISITS ARE AUTHORIZED TO MEDICAL CARE FACILITIES, 
BUT MUST BE APPROVED BY THE MEDICAL FACILITY COMMANDER 
AND 
ATTENDING PHYSICIAN AND MUST NOT INTERFERE WITH MEDICAL 
TREATMENT. REQUESTS TO VISIT MEDICAL CARE FACILITIES OUTSIDE 
THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES WILL BE COORDINATED BY THE 
UNIFIED COMMAND PA. 
 
4.H.6. REPORTERS MAY VISIT THOSE AREAS DESIGNATED BY THE 
FACILITY COMMANDER, BUT WILL NOT BE ALLOWED IN OPERATING 
ROOMS DURING OPERATING PROCEDURES. 
 
4.H.7. PERMISSION TO INTERVIEW OR PHOTOGRAPH A PATIENT WILL BE 
GRANTED ONLY WITH THE CONSENT OF THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN 
OR 
FACILITY COMMANDER AND WITH THE PATIENT'S INFORMED 
CONSENT, 
WITNESSED BY THE ESCORT. 
 
4.H.8. "INFORMED CONSENT" MEANS THE PATIENT UNDERSTANDS HIS 
OR 
HER PICTURE AND COMMENTS ARE BEING COLLECTED FOR NEWS 
MEDIA 
PURPOSES AND THEY MAY APPEAR NATIONWIDE IN NEWS MEDIA 
REPORTS. 
 
4.H.9. THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN OR ESCORT SHOULD ADVISE THE 
SERVICE MEMBER IF NOK HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED. 
 
5. IMMUNIZATIONS AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR. 
 
5.A. MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD ENSURE THAT MEDIA ARE 
PROPERLY IMMUNIZED BEFORE EMBEDDING WITH UNITS. THE 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL (CDC)-RECOMMENDED 
IMMUNIZATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT TO THE MIDDLE EAST INCLUDE 
HEPATITIS A; HEPATITIS B; RABIES; TETANUSDIPHTHERIA; AND 
TYPHOID. THE CDC RECOMMENDS MENINGOCOCCAL IMMUNIZATIONS 
FOR VISITORS TO MECCA. IF TRAVELING TO CERTAIN AREAS IN THE 
CENTCOM AOR, THE CDC RECOMMENDS TAKING PRESCRIPTION 
ANTIMALARIAL DRUGS. ANTHRAX AND SMALLPOX VACCINES WILL BE 
PROVIDED TO THE MEDIA AT NO EXPENSE TO THE GOVERNMENT (THE 




INFORMATION FOR TRAVELERS TO THE MIDDLE EAST, GO TO THE CDC 
WEB SITE AT 
HTTP://WWW.CDC.GOV/TRAVEL/MIDEAST.HTM. 
 
5.B. BECAUSE THE USE OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR, SUCH AS 
HELMETS OR FLAK VESTS, IS BOTH A PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
CHOICE, MEDIA WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROCURING/USING SUCH 
EQUIPMENT. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR, AS WELL AS CLOTHING, 
WILL 
BE SUBDUED IN COLOR AND APPEARANCE. 
 
5.C. EMBEDDED MEDIA ARE AUTHORIZED AND REQUIRED TO BE 
PROVIDEDWITH, ON A TEMPORARY LOAN BASIS, NUCLEAR, 
BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL (NBC) PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT BY THE UNIT 
WITH WHICH THEY ARE EMBEDDED. UNIT PERSONNEL WILL PROVIDE 
BASIC INSTRUCTION IN THE PROPER WEAR, USE, AND MAINTENANCE 
OF THE EQUIPMENT. UPON TERMINATION OF THE EMBED, INITIATED 
BY EITHER PARTY, THE NBC EQUIPMENT SHALL BE RETURNED TO THE 
EMBEDDING UNIT. IF SUFFICIENT NBC PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT IS NOT 
AVAILABLE FOR 
EMBEDDED MEDIA, COMMANDERS MAY PURCHASE ADDITIONAL 
EQUIPMENT, WITH FUNDS NORMALLY AVAILABLE FOR THAT PURPOSE, 





6.A. MEDIA PRODUCTS WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO SECURITY REVIEW OR 
CENSORSHIP EXCEPT AS INDICATED IN PARA. 6.A.1. SECURITY AT THE 
SOURCE WILL BE THE RULE. U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL SHALL 
PROTECT 
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION FROM UNAUTHORIZED OR INADVERTENT 
DISCLOSURE. MEDIA PROVIDED ACCESS TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION, 
INFORMATION WHICH IS NOT CLASSIFIED BUT WHICH MAY BE OF 
OPERATIONAL VALUE TO AN ADVERSARY OR WHEN COMBINED WITH 
OTHER UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION MAY REVEAL CLASSIFIED 
INFORMATION, WILL BE INFORMED IN ADVANCE BY THE UNIT 
COMMANDER OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 
RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OR DISCLOSURE OF SUCH INFORMATION. 
WHEN IN DOUBT, MEDIA WILL CONSULT WITH THE UNIT COMMANDER 
OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE. 
 
6.A.1. THE NATURE OF THE EMBEDDING PROCESS MAY INVOLVE 
OBSERVATION OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION, INCLUDING TROOP 
MOVEMENTS, BATTLE PREPARATIONS, MATERIEL CAPABILITIES AND 




WHEN A COMMANDER OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE HAS 
REASON TO BELIEVE THAT A MEDIA MEMBER WILL HAVE ACCESS TO 
THIS TYPE OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION, PRIOR TO ALLOWING SUCH 
ACCESS, HE/SHE WILL TAKE PRUDENT PRECAUTIONS TO ENSURE THE 
SECURITY OF THAT INFORMATION. THE PRIMARY SAFEGUARD WILL BE 
TO BRIEF MEDIA IN ADVANCE ABOUT WHAT INFORMATION IS 
SENSITIVE AND WHAT THE PARAMETERS ARE FOR COVERING THIS 
TYPE OF INFORMATION. IF MEDIA ARE INADVERTENTLY EXPOSED TO 
SENSITIVE INFORMATION THEY SHOULD BE BRIEFED AFTER EXPOSURE 
ON WHAT INFORMATION THEY SHOULD AVOID COVERING. IN 
INSTANCES WHERE A UNIT COMMANDER OR THE DESIGNATED 
REPRESENTATIVE DETERMINES THAT COVERAGE OF A STORY WILL 
INVOLVE EXPOSURE TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION BEYOND THE SCOPE 
OF WHAT MAY BE PROTECTED BY PREBRIEFING OR DEBRIEFING, BUT 
COVERAGE OF WHICH IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE DOD, THE 
COMMANDER MAY OFFER ACCESS IF THE REPORTER AGREES TO A 
SECURITY REVIEW OF THEIR COVERAGE. AGREEMENT TO SECURITY 
REVIEW IN EXCHANGE FOR THIS TYPE OF ACCESS MUST BE STRICTLY 
VOLUNTARY AND IF THE REPORTER DOES NOT AGREE, THEN ACCESS 
MAY NOT BE GRANTED. IF A SECURITY REVIEW IS AGREED TO, IT WILL 
NOT INVOLVE ANY EDITORIAL CHANGES; IT WILL BE CONDUCTED 
SOLELY TO ENSURE THAT NO SENSITIVE OR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 
IS INCLUDED IN THE PRODUCT. IF SUCH INFORMATION IS FOUND, THE 
MEDIA WILL BE ASKED TO REMOVE THAT INFORMATION FROM THE 
PRODUCT AND/OR EMBARGO THE PRODUCT UNTIL SUCH 
INFORMATION IS NO LONGER CLASSIFIED OR SENSITIVE. REVIEWS ARE 
TO BE DONE AS SOON AS PRACTICAL SO AS NOT TO INTERRUPT 
COMBAT OPERATIONS NOR DELAY REPORTING. IF THERE ARE 
DISPUTES RESULTING FROM THE SECURITY REVIEW PROCESS THEY 
MAY BE APPEALED THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, OR THROUGH 
PA CHANNELS TO OASD/PA. THIS PARAGRAPH DOES NOT AUTHORIZE 
COMMANDERS TO ALLOW MEDIA 
ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. 
 
6.A.2. MEDIA PRODUCTS WILL NOT BE CONFISCATED OR OTHERWISE 
IMPOUNDED. IF IT IS BELIEVED THAT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION HAS 
BEEN COMPROMISED AND THE MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE REFUSES TO 
REMOVE THAT INFORMATION NOTIFY THE CPIC AND/OR OASD/PA AS 




7. MISCELLANEOUS/COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS: 
 




PROCEDURES AND ASSIGNMENT AUTHORITY MAY BE TRANSFERRED 
TO 
CENTCOM PA AT A LATER DATE. THIS AUTHORITY MAY BE FURTHER 
DELEGATED AT CENTCOM'S DISCRETION. 
 
7.B. THIS GUIDANCE AUTHORIZES BLANKET APPROVAL FOR NON-
LOCAL 
AND LOCAL MEDIA TRAVEL ABOARD DOD AIRLIFT FOR ALL 
EMBEDDED MEDIA ON A NO-COST, SPACE AVAILABLE BASIS. NO 
ADDITIONAL COSTS SHALL BE INCURRED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO 
PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IAW DODI 5410.15, PARA 3.4. 
 
7.C. USE OF LIPSTICK AND HELMET-MOUNTED CAMERAS ON COMBAT 
SORTIES IS APPROVED AND ENCOURAGED TO THE GREATEST EXTENT 
POSSIBLE. 
 
8. OASD(PA) POC FOR EMBEDDING MEDIA IS MAJ TIM BLAIR, DSN 227- 
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